{"id":2651,"cve":"CVE-2026-114620","cve_url":"https:\/\/www.cvedetails.com\/cve\/CVE-2026-114620\/","cwe":"CWE-918","cwe_number":918,"cwe_url":"https:\/\/cwe.mitre.org\/data\/definitions\/918","cvss_score":5.4,"published":"2026-10-22","owasp":"A10 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)","odc":"Checking","cdc":"Missing Check","category":"Input Validation and Sanitization","subcategory":"Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)","scope":"Remote","impact":"Information Disclosure","summary":"Authlib <1.9.0 SSRF via unchecked request_uri in JWTAuthenticationRequest.","permalink":"https:\/\/netpack.pt\/vaitp\/vulnerability\/CVE-2026-114620\/","description":"Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to 1.9.0, Authlib's RFC 9101 JWTAuthenticationRequest passes the unauthenticated, client-controlled request_uri parameter to the abstract get_request_object() hook before applying a destination or registration policy; the hook itself performs no network request, while the documentation demonstrates an unrestricted HTTP fetch. In deployments whose integrator implements that hook as an unrestricted outbound fetch, a remote attacker who knows a valid public client identifier can make the authorization server request internal, link-local, or otherwise unintended URLs and can distinguish fetch outcomes through different error responses and timing. Deployments whose custom hook already applies a secure allowlist, destination controls, and retrieval limits are not affected. The JWTAuthenticationRequest implementation in authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py forwards request_uri to get_request_object() before an application-approved retrieval policy accepts the destination. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.","solution":"Upgrade Authlib to version\u202f1.9.0\u202for later.","affected_component":"Authlib","fixed_by_upgrading":true,"vulnerable_code":"import re\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nclass AuthServer:\n    def get_request_object(self, request_uri: str) -> dict:\n        # In a typical integration this might perform an unrestricted HTTP fetch.\n        # Here we simulate the unsafe behavior.\n        return {\"fetched\": request_uri}\n\n    def handle_jwt_authentication(self, request):\n        # Extract request_uri from the JWT authentication request (unvalidated)\n        request_uri = request.get(\"request_uri\")\n        # VULNERABLE: passes client\u2011controlled request_uri to get_request_object before any policy check\n        request_obj = self.get_request_object(request_uri)\n        # Further processing assumes request_obj is safe\n        return request_obj\n","patched_code":"import re\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nclass AuthServer:\n    def get_request_object(self, request_uri: str) -> dict:\n        # Secure implementation still performs the fetch but expects a validated URI.\n        return {\"fetched\": request_uri}\n\n    def _is_allowed_uri(self, uri: str) -> bool:\n        # Simple allow\u2011list: only HTTPS URLs to example.com are permitted\n        parsed = urlparse(uri)\n        return (\n            parsed.scheme == \"https\" and\n            re.fullmatch(r\"[^.]+\\.example\\.com\", parsed.hostname or \"\")\n        )\n\n    def handle_jwt_authentication(self, request):\n        request_uri = request.get(\"request_uri\")\n        # FIX: validate request_uri against an allow\u2011list before calling get_request_object\n        if not self._is_allowed_uri(request_uri):\n            raise ValueError(\"Disallowed request_uri\")\n        request_obj = self.get_request_object(request_uri)\n        return request_obj\n","payload_needed":true,"payload":null,"payload_status":"model_refused","published_fix":[{"repository":"authlib\/authlib","commit_url":"https:\/\/github.com\/authlib\/authlib\/commit\/6563f6f7a8c2f71d2f85ee7511d72a4fbae3acc0","commit_subject":"fix(oauth): enforce nonce and JAR request validation","units":[{"file":"authlib\/integrations\/base_client\/async_openid.py","function":"AsyncOpenIDMixin.parse_id_token"},{"file":"authlib\/integrations\/base_client\/sync_openid.py","function":"OpenIDMixin.parse_id_token"},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":null},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest.get_request_object"},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest.get_request_object_signing_algorithms"},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest.get_server_metadata"},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest.parse_authorization_request"},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest._decode_request_object"},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest._get_raw_request_object"}]},{"repository":"authlib\/authlib","commit_url":"https:\/\/github.com\/authlib\/authlib\/commit\/891e3f10ae5989176211f8be35dcc7cd40aa92c6","commit_subject":"fix(oidc): separate request URI registration from JAR policy","units":[{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":null},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest.get_server_metadata"},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest.validate_request_uri"},{"file":"authlib\/oauth2\/rfc9101\/authorization_server.py","function":"JWTAuthenticationRequest._get_raw_request_object"},{"file":"authlib\/oidc\/core\/__init__.py","function":null}]}],"references":null}