picklescan fails to detect code execution via idlelib in pickle files.
picklescan through 0.0.26 fails to detect malicious pickle files that invoke idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode in __reduce__ methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes arbitrary commands when the file is loaded via pickle.load(), enabling supply chain attacks on PyTorch models and saved Python objects. This is fixed in version 0.0.30.
Vim's Python omni-completion allows code execution via crafted docstrings.
Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0699, Vim's Python omni-completion (runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim and the legacy pythoncomplete.vim) executes reconstructed function and class definitions from the current buffer with exec() as part of populating the completion dictionary. When reconstructing that source, each scope's docstring is inserted verbatim between triple quotes with no escaping, so a hostile buffer can break out of the triple-quoted literal and execute attacker-controlled Python during omni-completion. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.2.0699.
AutoGPT is vulnerable to DoS via complex expressions in the text template.
AutoGPT is a workflow automation platform for creating, deploying, and managing continuous artificial intelligence agents. In versions prior to 0.6.52, the Fill Text Template block is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. While the backend implements a SandboxedEnvironment to prevent unauthorized attribute access (e.g., blocking __class__), it fails to limit the computational complexity or execution time of the expressions. An attacker can input computationally expensive Python/Jinja2 expressions that consume the server's CPU and memory, leading to a complete system hang or crash. In multi-tenant or self-hosted environments, this results in a complete service outage and "noisy neighbor" effects that require manual administrative intervention to recover. This issue has been fixed in version 0.6.52.
py7zr allows arbitrary file write via a crafted symbolic link in an archive.
py7zr is a Python-based library and utility to support 7zip archive compression, decompression, encryption and decryption. Versions 1.1.2 and below contain an an arbitrary file write vulnerability, which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using extractall to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service. This issue has been fixed in version 1.1.3.
CPU exhaustion DoS in Mistune due to quadratic-time link text parsing.
Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.3.0, Mistune is vulnerable to a CPU exhaustion DoS due to superlinear (approximately O(nยฒ)) behavior in parse_link_text. When parsing Markdown containing many consecutive [ characters, parse_link_text repeatedly scans the input using a regex search inside a loop. Each iteration re-scans a large portion of the remaining string, resulting in quadratic-time behavior. An attacker-controlled Markdown input can therefore trigger excessive CPU usage with a very small payload. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.3.0.
Zip Slip in Docling's model download allows arbitrary file write, RCE.
Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. Prior to 2.91.0, the EasyOCR model download functionality extracted ZIP archives without validating member paths, enabling Zip Slip attacks. If an attacker could compromise the model download source (via supply chain attack, DNS spoofing, or MITM), they could write arbitrary files to any location writable by the process, potentially achieving remote code execution by overwriting Python files or system binaries, persistent backdoors by modifying startup scripts or SSH keys, and data corruption or system compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.91.0.
Feast unsafe deserialization allows unauthenticated RCE via a gRPC request.
Feast before 0.63.0 contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated or unauthorized attackers to achieve remote code execution by sending a crafted gRPC request to the registry server. The user_defined_function.body field of an OnDemandFeatureView spec is decoded from base64 and passed to dill.loads() before any authorization check is performed, enabling attackers to embed a malicious serialized Python object with an arbitrary __reduce__ method to execute OS commands as the feast service account.
motionEye < 0.44.0 absolute path traversal allows arbitrary file read.
motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called "motion," which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.
Crawl4AI insecure eval allows sandbox escape and remote code execution.
Crawl4AI is an open-source LLM friendly web crawler & scraper. Prior to 0.8.7, the _safe_eval_expression() function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (gi_frame, f_back, f_builtins) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution. The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via POST /crawl with a crafted extraction schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.7.
Unauthenticated RCE in Langflow Shareable Playground via code injection.
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to 1.9.2, the "Shareable Playground" (or "Public Flows" in code) contains a critical RCE vulnerability. Shareable Playground feature works by enabling the execution of workflows by unauthenticated users, by accessing a link. Specifically, it enables the route /api/v1/build_public_tmp to execute any public flow, given a public flow ID. When the route executes the flow, it allows for providing arbitrary custom Python code as the nodes code, inside the JSON payload. The vulnerable field is data.nodes[X].data.node.template.code.value. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.9.2.
Introducing the "VAITP dataset": a specialized repository of Python vulnerabilities and patches, meticulously compiled for the use of the security research community. As Python's prominence grows, understanding and addressing potential security vulnerabilities become crucial. Crafted by and for the cybersecurity community, this dataset offers a valuable resource for researchers, analysts, and developers to analyze and mitigate the security risks associated with Python. Through the comprehensive exploration of vulnerabilities and corresponding patches, the VAITP dataset fosters a safer and more resilient Python ecosystem, encouraging collaborative advancements in programming security.
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
Sun Tzu – “The Art of War”
:: Shaping the future through research and ingenuity ::
