VAITP

Flowise before 3.1.3 contains a regex-based Python code validator bypass in CSV and Airtable Agent nodes that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject malicious code via prompt injection. Attackers can exploit unblocked pandas functions like pd.read_json() to exfiltrate datasets, perform SSRF against internal services, or achieve code execution through the unauthenticated prediction API.

Flowise before 3.1.3 contains a code injection vulnerability in the CSV Agent node's customReadCSV parameter that allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary Python code. The validator uses a static regex blocklist that can be bypassed through obfuscation techniques, enabling attackers to execute code in the unsandboxed pyodide environment with full system access.

Flowise before 3.1.3 contains a code injection vulnerability in the Airtable Agent node that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary Python code by bypassing the pythonCodeValidator blocklist through obfuscation techniques. Attackers can send crafted prompts to a chatflow using the Airtable Agent node to inject malicious Python code that executes in an unsandboxed pyodide environment with full access to the host operating system.

Fujitsu Research's OneCompression library 1.2.0 contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by supplying a crafted model.pt checkpoint file, as QuantizedModelLoader.load_quantized_model_pt() unconditionally calls torch.load with weights_only=False, invoking Python's pickle machinery during deserialization. Attackers can embed malicious __reduce__ methods in a crafted model checkpoint to execute arbitrary Python code, including system commands, when the library loads the file from a caller-selected model directory.

Insufficient input sanitization in Snowflake Python API (`snowflake.core`) versions prior to 1.13.0 allowed confused-deputy privilege escalation through two related weaknesses: path traversal (CWE-22) via unencoded `..` identifier path segments, and HTTP parameter pollution (CWE-141) via unencoded `&`/`#`/`=` characters in query string values. An attacker with access to a downstream application built on snowflake.core could exploit the path traversal by supplying `..` as an object name, causing `snowflake.core` to issue REST requests against a parent resource or exploit the parameter pollution by injecting `&`/`#`/`=` into a free-form name field to override constraints on swap, clone, or rename operations — all executed under the application's privileged session. Successful exploitation requires the attacker to control an identifier or object-name string in an application built on snowflake.core that passes it to `snowflake.core` under a higher-privileged Snowflake session (e.g., an EXECUTE AS OWNER stored procedure, Streamlit app, or Native App). The fix is available in Snowflake Python API version 1.13.0, which also addresses several additional security findings. Users must manually upgrade.

calibre is an e-book manager. Prior to 9.12.0, calibre processes attacker-controlled composite_template metadata from a malicious EPUB, OPF, PDF, or similar file through program: and a nested template() call whose formatter does not inherit allow_python_templates=False, allowing a nested python: template to reach compile_python_template and execute arbitrary Python code when the file is opened or imported. This issue is fixed in version 9.12.0.

DB-GPT v0.8.1 contains an unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability that allows remote attackers to write arbitrary files to any location on the server by injecting directory traversal sequences into the user_id HTTP header of the Python file-upload endpoint. Attackers can send a crafted multipart upload request with a traversal-poisoned user_id header to escape the intended upload directory and write attacker-controlled content to locations such as Python startup hooks, cron directories, or agent scripts, resulting in remote code execution.

python-socketio is a Python implementation of the Socket.IO realtime client and server. The python-socketio server stores binary `EVENT` and `ACK` messages in memory while it waits to receive their binary attachments. Once all the attachments are received, these messages are then processed. Prior to version 5.16.4, an attacker can submit a binary message and intentionally omit sending one or more of its attachments to cause the message along with the partial list of received attachments to stay in memory for a long time. Version 5.16.4 takes the following measures to address this issue: Binary packets are only accepted from authenticated clients and, when a client disconnects, the server checks if there is a partial binary message being held for the client and deletes it.

python-engineio is a Python implementation of the Engine.IO realtime client and server. Versions prior to 4.13.2 have two specific configurations of the python-engineio server in which the size of incoming messages is not checked before the messages are loaded into memory. An attacker can take advantage of these to cause unnecessary memory allocations in the python-engineio server. The two cases are POST requests, when using ASGI with the long polling transport and WebSocket messages, when using Aiohttp with the WebSocket transport. Version 4.13.2 addresses this issue. ASGI severs now only load the body of incoming requests into memory after the client is confirmed to be known and authenticated, and the payload size is below the maximum allowed size. Requests that do not comply with these requirements are discarded. Aiohttp servers configure the maximum payload size in the underlying WebSocket layer from Aiohttp, so that large messages are discarded by Aiohttp before they are delivered to python-engineio.

python-engineio is a Python implementation of the Engine.IO realtime client and server. Prior to version 4.13.2, an attacker can cause the creation of unnecessary background threads in the python-engineio server by exploiting the heartbeat mechanism, which launches a thread when a new connection is received, and when the client sends a PONG packet. This issue primarily affects synchronous servers. Asynchronous servers allocate background tasks instead of physical threads, which are lightweight and less likely to cause denial of service. However, the fix that was implemented was also applied to the asynchronous case. Version 4.13.2 addresses this issue as follows: The initial background thread (or async task( for heartbeat management is only launched if a client passes authentication in the `connect` handler; and the server now ensures that there is only one background heatbeat thread (or async task) per client at a given point in time. Out of sequence PONG packets are now discarded when an active heartbeat thread is already running.