VAITP

A vulnerability was determined in QUSETIONS MiniCode-Python 0.1.0. This vulnerability affects the function subprocess.Popen of the file minicode/config.py of the component Project File Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to os command injection. The attack may be launched remotely. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. It is stated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. Upgrading to version 0.1.0-rc1 is able to resolve this issue. This patch is called 9d868dc2550f426c6ddf8ee98f30ffe450ca5e32. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component.

The urwid web display backend (urwid/display/web.py) generates web session identifiers (urwid_id) in Screen.start() by concatenating two random.randrange(10**9) calls that use Python's Mersenne Twister PRNG, which is not cryptographically secure. Each call consumes approximately 30 bits of PRNG state, and the Mersenne Twister internal state is approximately 19,937 bits, so an attacker who observes approximately 334 session IDs (for example via the X-Urwid-ID HTTP response header) can fully reconstruct the internal state and predict all past and future session IDs (Path B). The same identifier is also used as the filename of a FIFO created in the world-listable /tmp directory (for example /tmp/urwid375487765176907690.in), so any local user on the host can list /tmp to enumerate active session tokens directly (Path A). With a valid session ID, an attacker can read the victim's terminal screen via the polling endpoint, inject keystrokes into the victim's session (yielding OS-level code execution with the session owner's privileges if the session runs a shell), and inject exit sequences or flood the FIFO to terminate or crash the session. A prior Bandit S311 warning on this usage was suppressed with # noqa: S311 rather than fixed

uproot dynamically generates Python class source code from ROOT TStreamerInfo records in a file and compiles it at runtime. Some file-controlled streamer metadata fields (for example, streamer element names) are interpolated into the generated Python source without safe quoting via repr() or the !r format specifier. An attacker who can supply a crafted ROOT file can place Python expression-breaking content into a streamer metadata field. When uproot generates and invokes the corresponding reader method, the injected Python expression is evaluated in the context of the process opening the file, resulting in arbitrary Python code execution in applications that open or process attacker-controlled ROOT files with affected uproot code paths.

Datadog dd-trace-py is the Datadog Python APM client. Prior to 4.8.2, Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES limits on the extract path. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against HTTP services with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.8.2.

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 contain a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the code validation API endpoint. The POST /api/v1/validate/code endpoint accepts user-supplied Python code and executes it directly using Python's built-in exec() function without sandboxing, input validation, or privilege restrictions, enabling any authenticated user to execute arbitrary system commands with the full privileges of the Langflow server process.

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 contain a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the disk-based caching mechanism. The AsyncDiskCache class uses Python's unsafe pickle.loads() function to deserialize cached objects from disk without validation, integrity verification, or authentication, enabling arbitrary code execution when malicious pickle payloads are processed. Attackers who can influence cached data through file system access, malicious workflow inputs, custom components, or API manipulation can achieve complete system compromise with the privileges of the Langflow server process.

joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. Prior to 1.6.8, joserfc.jwt.decode accepts attacker-forged HMAC-signed tokens when the caller-supplied verification key is the empty string or None, because HMACAlgorithm.sign and HMACAlgorithm.verify in src/joserfc/_rfc7518/jws_algs.py pass the output of OctKey.get_op_key(...) to hmac.new(...) and OctKey.import_key in src/joserfc/_rfc7518/oct_key.py only emits a SecurityWarning for keys shorter than 14 bytes without rejecting zero-length input. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.8.

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.1 Langflow could allow an authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges on the system due to improper validation of user supplied input in the Python Interpreter component.

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 Langflow versions up to 1.9.2 (commit 94981c443d4918517b9e8163d70fc598dc33a32d) contain a code injection vulnerability in the Policies component's ToolGuard integration that bypasses the allow_custom_components=false security control. The vulnerability exists because the validation mechanism only checks the main component source code in node_template["code"]["value"] but fails to validate dynamic CodeInput fields that store generated ToolGuard Python files. Attackers can embed malicious Python code in these unvalidated dynamic fields, which are persisted in Flow.data and later executed server-side when a guarded tool is invoked through the ToolGuard runtime. This allows authenticated users with flow creation privileges to achieve arbitrary Python code execution on the backend despite custom component restrictions. The vulnerability can be escalated through cross-tenant flow manipulation via the agentic MCP update_flow_component_field tool, which accepts attacker-controlled user_id parameters, enabling attackers to inject malicious code into victim users' flows. When combined with publicly accessible flows and specific misconfigurations (AUTO_LOGIN=true, NEW_USER_IS_ACTIVE=true), the attack can be conducted with reduced authentication requirements.

Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.16, _read_character_string and _read_string in src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py advanced self.offset by attacker-declared RDLENGTH without checking it against self._data_len, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to send a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record with rdlength=65535 and seed DNSCache and ServiceInfo.properties with truncated, attacker-shaped key/value or address records. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.16.