AIOHTTP unbounded pipelined requests can lead to DoS via memory exhaustion.
AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.1, no limit was present on the number of pipelined requests that could be queued. An attacker may be able to use pipelined requests to use excessive amounts of memory, potentially leading to DoS. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.14.1.
Negative Content-Length leads to DoS via memory exhaustion.
Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.31, parse_form() did not validate the Content-Length header before using it to bound its chunked read of the request body. A negative Content-Length turned the bounded read into a read-until-EOF, so the entire body was loaded into memory in a single read instead of in fixed-size chunks. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.31.
Inefficient form data parsing in Python-Multipart allows for a DoS attack.
Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, when parsing application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, QuerystringParser located the field separator with a two step lookup: it first scanned the entire remaining buffer for &, and only when no & existed anywhere ahead did it fall back to scanning for ;. For a body that uses ; as the separator and contains no &, every field iteration performed a full failed & scan over the entire remaining buffer before locating the nearby ;. With N semicolon separated fields in a chunk of size B, this yields O(B^2) byte comparisons per chunk. An attacker can submit a small crafted body of the form a;a;a;... and cause the parser to spend seconds of CPU per request. A handful of concurrent requests can exhaust worker processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.
Incorrect semicolon handling in form data allows parameter smuggling.
Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, QuerystringParser treated ; as a field separator in application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, in addition to &. The WHATWG URL standard, modern browsers, and Python's urllib.parse (since the CVE-2021-23336 fix) treat only & as a separator. This creates a parser differential: the same bytes are tokenized into different fields than a WHATWG compliant intermediary would produce, allowing an attacker to smuggle extra form fields past an upstream body inspecting component. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.
Python-Multipart allows parameter smuggling via Content-Disposition parsing.
Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, parse_options_header parsed Content-Disposition (and Content-Type) headers with email.message.Message, which transparently applies RFC 2231/5987 decoding. The extended parameter syntax (filename*=charset'lang'value, name*=..., and the filename*0/filename*1 continuation form) is decoded and surfaced under the bare filename/name key, and overrides the plain parameter when both are present. RFC 7578 ยง4.2 explicitly forbids the filename* form in multipart/form-data. Components that follow RFC 7578, or that do not implement RFC 2231/5987 decoding for multipart/form-data (WAFs, proxies, gateways), may interpret such a header differently. An attacker can exploit that difference to smuggle a different field name or filename past an upstream inspector to the backend. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.
AIOHTTP is vulnerable to header injection via multipart/payload headers.
AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.0, attacker-controlled input included into multipart/payload headers can be used to modify a request to inject additional headers or similar. In the unlikely situation that an application is passing user-controlled strings into MultipartWriter.append(headers=...) or Payload.headers, then an attacker may be able to modify the request to inject headers or change the contents of the request. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.14.0.
Langflow auth bypass allows unauthenticated RCE via poor isolation.
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.9.3 has an vulnerability due to an improper isolation of Python execution combined with an authentication bypass that allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on the host system, resulting in complete compromise
Command injection in Dulwich's merge driver via crafted file paths.
Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, Dulwich's `ProcessMergeDriver` substitutes the file path (from the git tree, controllable by an attacker via a malicious branch) into the merge driver command via the `%P` placeholder and executes it with `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. An attacker who can cause a victim to merge an untrusted branch can achieve arbitrary command execution by crafting malicious file paths. Version 1.2.5 fixes the issue.
Dulwich on Windows allows RCE via arbitrary file write in malicious repos.
Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Versions starting with 0.10.0 and prior to 1.2.5 have an arbitrary file write leading to remote code execution when cloning or checking out a malicious Git repository on Windows. Dulwich's path-element validator accepted tree entries whose filenames contained bytes that Windows interprets as structural path syntax. Contributing configuration bugs made matters worse. The core.protectNTFS and core.protectHFS settings were looked up under a wrong option name and so user-set values were silently ignored, and core.protectNTFS only defaulted to true on Windows (Git upstream has defaulted it to true everywhere since CVE-2019-1353). Both have been corrected. Anyone who clones, fetches, or checks out an untrusted repository with Dulwich on Windows - either through the Dulwich CLI, porcelain.clone, or any downstream tool built on Dulwich - is impacted. POSIX clones are not directly exploitable (on POSIX \ is a literal filename byte), but a POSIX user can unknowingly propagate a malicious tree to Windows consumers via push or re-publication. This issue is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. There is no effective pre-patch workaround. On affected versions the core.protectNTFS configuration key was silently ignored, so setting it to true does not mitigate the issue. Users who cannot upgrade should avoid cloning, fetching, or checking out untrusted repositories with Dulwich on Windows. After upgrading the NTFS validator is on by default on every platform, so no additional configuration is required.
onnx-mlir Placeholder Node Cache Handler uses a weak hash for key generation.
A vulnerability has been found in onnx onnx-mlir up to 0.5.0.0. Affected by this issue is the function generate_hash_key of the file src/Runtime/python/torch_onnxmlir/src/torch_onnxmlir/backend.py of the component Placeholder Node Cache Handler. Such manipulation leads to use of weak hash. An attack has to be approached locally. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The name of the patch is 72c5187ff6d13c2c2b3d3789b8f5faf99f08a5b4. Applying a patch is advised to resolve this issue.
Introducing the "VAITP dataset": a specialized repository of Python vulnerabilities and patches, meticulously compiled for the use of the security research community. As Python's prominence grows, understanding and addressing potential security vulnerabilities become crucial. Crafted by and for the cybersecurity community, this dataset offers a valuable resource for researchers, analysts, and developers to analyze and mitigate the security risks associated with Python. Through the comprehensive exploration of vulnerabilities and corresponding patches, the VAITP dataset fosters a safer and more resilient Python ecosystem, encouraging collaborative advancements in programming security.
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
Sun Tzu – “The Art of War”
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