Pillow: Decompression bomb in font processing allows for Denial of Service.
Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/FontFile.py FontFile.compile() assembled per-glyph images into a combined bitmap with Image.new("1", (xsize, ysize)) without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing a font to trigger excessive allocation during conversion or saving. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.
Pillow is vulnerable to memory exhaustion via a crafted PCF font file.
Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/PcfFontFile.py _load_bitmaps() read glyph dimensions from the PCF METRICS section and passed them directly to Image.frombytes() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing crafted PCF font data to cause excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.
Fickling's incomplete denylist allows code execution via unsafe modules.
Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.10 do not include the Python standard library modules _posixsubprocess, site, and atexit in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist (fickle.py). Because these modules are absent from the denylist, fickling's check_safety() function returns LIKELY_SAFE with zero findings for pickle payloads that invoke dangerous functions including _posixsubprocess.fork_exec (C-level process spawner capable of executing arbitrary binaries), site.execsitecustomize (executes arbitrary site customization code), and atexit._run_exitfuncs (triggers all registered exit handler callbacks). The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate; a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. This shares the same root cause as CVE-2026-22607 (cProfile), CVE-2025-67748 (pty), and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types). OvertlyBadEvals does not flag these modules because they are standard library imports. UnsafeImports does not flag them because they are not in the denylist. The UnusedVariables heuristic is defeated by the SETITEMS opcode pattern.
Picklescan detection bypass allows code execution via a numpy gadget.
Picklescan before 0.0.33 fails to detect the numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef gadget in pickle __reduce__ methods, allowing arbitrary code execution. Attackers can craft malicious pickle files that execute arbitrary Python code when loaded, bypassing Picklescan's safety checks and enabling supply-chain poisoning of shared model files.
pypdf: Crafted PDF causes Denial of Service via memory exhaustion.
pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.13.3, a maliciously crafted PDF can cause DoS. An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to large memory usage, as MAX_DECLARED_STREAM_LENGTH is sometimes ignored. This requires parsing a content stream without a /Length value. This issue has been fixed in version 6.13.3.
ADSys uses HTTP for cert enrollment, allowing MITM trust store poisoning.
An issue was discovered in Canonical ADSys upstream versions through v0.16.2. During Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate auto-enrollment via the vendored Samba client script (internal/policies/certificate/python/vendor_samba/gp/gp_cert_auto_enroll_ext.py), ADSys utilizes a plaintext HTTP connection (http://) instead of a secure HTTPS connection (https://) to request the CA certificate from the Active Directory Certificate Services server (GetCACert). An unauthenticated network attacker positioned between the managed Ubuntu host and the configured AD CS CA hostname can conduct a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. By intercepting the plaintext HTTP request, the attacker can supply an arbitrary, attacker-controlled Root CA certificate. Because the system automatically accepts this certificate and registers it into the local system trust store via update-ca-certificates, this results in system-wide trust store poisoning. Consequently, TLS clients utilizing the operating system trust store on the affected machine will accept rogue certificates for arbitrary domains, enabling persistent decryption and interception of subsequent TLS connections. This issue is resolved in version v0.16.3.
pypdf: Crafted PDF causes an infinite loop on layout text extraction.
pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.13.0, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires extracting the text in layout mode. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.13.0.
pypdf: An infinite loop can occur when merging a crafted PDF with outlines.
pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.13.0, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires merging a file with outlines into a writer. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.13.0.
Infinite loop in pypdf when merging a crafted PDF with threads.
pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.13.1, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires merging a file with threads/articles into a writer. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.13.1.
pypdf: Crafted PDF with a PNG predictor leads to Denial of Service.
pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.12.2, an attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires accessing a stream which uses the /FlateDecode filter with a PNG predictor. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.12.2.
Introducing the "VAITP dataset": a specialized repository of Python vulnerabilities and patches, meticulously compiled for the use of the security research community. As Python's prominence grows, understanding and addressing potential security vulnerabilities become crucial. Crafted by and for the cybersecurity community, this dataset offers a valuable resource for researchers, analysts, and developers to analyze and mitigate the security risks associated with Python. Through the comprehensive exploration of vulnerabilities and corresponding patches, the VAITP dataset fosters a safer and more resilient Python ecosystem, encouraging collaborative advancements in programming security.
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
Sun Tzu – “The Art of War”
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