Open WebUI authenticated RCE in the load_tool_module_by_id function.
Open WebUI load_tool_module_by_id Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Open WebUI. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the load_tool_module_by_id function. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute Python code. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the service account. Was ZDI-CAN-28257.
MetaGPT actionoutput_str_to_mapping unauthenticated code injection RCE.
Foundation Agents MetaGPT actionoutput_str_to_mapping Code Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Foundation Agents MetaGPT. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the actionoutput_str_to_mapping function. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute Python code. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the service account. Was ZDI-CAN-28124.
Inkscape's bundled Python on macOS enables TCC bypass for local file access.
MacOS version of Inkscape bundles a Python interpreter that inherits the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) permissions granted by the user to the main application bundle. An attacker with local user access can invoke this interpreter with arbitrary commands or scripts, leveraging the application's previously granted TCC permissions to access user's files in privacy-protected folders without triggering user prompts. Accessing other resources beyond previously granted TCC permissions will prompt the user for approval in the name of Inkscape, potentially disguising attacker's malicious intent. This issue has been fixed in 1.4.3 version of Inkscape.
LDAP search filter injection in Moonraker allows brute-force user discovery.
Moonraker is a Python web server providing API access to Klipper 3D printing firmware. In versions 0.9.3 and below, instances configured with the "ldap" component enabled are vulnerable to LDAP search filter injection techniques via the login endpoint. The 401 error response message can be used to determine whether or not a search was successful, allowing for brute force methods to discover LDAP entries on the server such as user IDs and user attributes. This issue has been fixed in version 0.10.0.
wheel unpack allows arbitrary file permission changes via a crafted wheel.
wheel is a command line tool for manipulating Python wheel files, as defined in PEP 427. In versions 0.46.1 and below, the unpack function is vulnerable to file permission modification through mishandling of file permissions after extraction. The logic blindly trusts the filename from the archive header for the chmod operation, even though the extraction process itself might have sanitized the path. Attackers can craft a malicious wheel file that, when unpacked, changes the permissions of critical system files (e.g., /etc/passwd, SSH keys, config files), allowing for Privilege Escalation or arbitrary code execution by modifying now-writable scripts. This issue has been fixed in version 0.46.2.
Insecure Grist pyodide sandbox allows for arbitrary code execution.
Grist is spreadsheet software using Python as its formula language. Grist offers several methods for running those formulas in a sandbox, for cases where the user may be working with untrusted spreadsheets. One such method runs them in pyodide, but pyodide on node does not have a useful sandbox barrier. If a user of Grist sets `GRIST_SANDBOX_FLAVOR` to `pyodide` and opens a malicious document, that document could run arbitrary processes on the server hosting Grist. The problem has been addressed in Grist version 1.7.9 and up, by running pyodide under deno. As a workaround, a user can use the gvisor-based sandbox by setting `GRIST_SANDBOX_FLAVOR` to `gvisor`.
Insecure deserialization in Tendenci's Helpdesk allows authenticated RCE.
Tendenci is an open source content management system built for non-profits, associations and cause-based sites. Versions 15.3.11 and below include a critical deserialization vulnerability in the Helpdesk module (which is not enabled by default). This vulnerability allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) by an authenticated user with staff security level due to using Python's pickle module in helpdesk /reports/. The original CVE-2020-14942 was incompletely patched. While ticket_list() was fixed to use safe JSON deserialization, the run_report() function still uses unsafe pickle.loads(). The impact is limited to the permissions of the user running the application, typically www-data, which generally lacks write (except for upload directories) and execute permissions. This issue has been fixed in version 15.3.12.
Untrusted code execution in vLLM via malicious Hugging Face model repos.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.14.0, vLLM loads Hugging Face `auto_map` dynamic modules during model resolution without gating on `trust_remote_code`, allowing attacker-controlled Python code in a model repo/path to execute at server startup. An attacker who can influence the model repo/path (local directory or remote Hugging Face repo) can achieve arbitrary code execution on the vLLM host during model load. This happens before any request handling and does not require API access. Version 0.14.0 fixes the issue.
Python's base64 decode accepts +/ regardless of the altchars parameter.
When passing data to the b64decode(), standard_b64decode(), and urlsafe_b64decode() functions in the "base64" module the characters "+/" will always be accepted, regardless of the value of "altchars" parameter, typically used to establish an "alternative base64 alphabet" such as the URL safe alphabet. This behavior matches what is recommended in earlier base64 RFCs, but newer RFCs now recommend either dropping characters outside the specified base64 alphabet or raising an error. The old behavior has the possibility of causing data integrity issues. This behavior can only be insecure if your application uses an alternate base64 alphabet (without "+/"). If your application does not use the "altchars" parameter or the urlsafe_b64decode() function, then your application does not use an alternative base64 alphabet. The attached patches DOES NOT make the base64-decode behavior raise an error, as this would be a change in behavior and break existing programs. Instead, the patch deprecates the behavior which will be replaced with the newly recommended behavior in a future version of Python.ย Users are recommended to mitigate by verifying user-controlled inputs match the base64 alphabet they are expecting or verify that their application would not be affected if the b64decode() functions accepted "+" or "/" outside of altchars.
PLY's yacc() `picklefile` param allows RCE via unsafe deserialization.
An undocumented and unsafe feature in the PLY (Python Lex-Yacc) library 3.11 allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) via the `picklefile` parameter in the `yacc()` function. This parameter accepts a `.pkl` file that is deserialized with `pickle.load()` without validation. Because `pickle` allows execution of embedded code via `__reduce__()`, an attacker can achieve code execution by passing a malicious pickle file. The parameter is not mentioned in official documentation or the GitHub repository, yet it is active in the PyPI version. This introduces a stealthy backdoor and persistence risk.
Introducing the "VAITP dataset": a specialized repository of Python vulnerabilities and patches, meticulously compiled for the use of the security research community. As Python's prominence grows, understanding and addressing potential security vulnerabilities become crucial. Crafted by and for the cybersecurity community, this dataset offers a valuable resource for researchers, analysts, and developers to analyze and mitigate the security risks associated with Python. Through the comprehensive exploration of vulnerabilities and corresponding patches, the VAITP dataset fosters a safer and more resilient Python ecosystem, encouraging collaborative advancements in programming security.
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
Sun Tzu – “The Art of War”
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