VAITP

AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.1, during cleanup it is possible for a compressed request body to be decompressed into memory in one chunk. An attacker may be able to send a compressed payload in specific situations that could be decompressed into memory, potentially leading to DoS (a zip bomb edge case). This vulnerability is fixed in 3.14.1.

AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.1, DigestAuthMiddleware can send an authentication response after following a cross-origin redirect. This likely requires an open redirect vulnerability or similar on the target domain for an attacker to be able to execute. Further, the attacker is only receiving the digest, so should only be able to extract the user's credentials if the cryptography is weak or there is some kind of password reuse. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.14.1.

AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.1, the server_hostname TLS SNI check can be bypassed when an existing connection is reused. If an application makes multiple requests to the same domain, but with different per-request server_hostname parameters, then the later calls may succeed by reusing the existing connection when they should have been rejected due to the TLS SNI check. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.14.1.

AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.1, if an attacker sends large incomplete websocket frame payloads, it may be possible to bypass the usual size limits on memory use. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.14.1.

AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.1, no limit was present on the number of pipelined requests that could be queued. An attacker may be able to use pipelined requests to use excessive amounts of memory, potentially leading to DoS. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.14.1.

Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.31, parse_form() did not validate the Content-Length header before using it to bound its chunked read of the request body. A negative Content-Length turned the bounded read into a read-until-EOF, so the entire body was loaded into memory in a single read instead of in fixed-size chunks. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.31.

Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, when parsing application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, QuerystringParser located the field separator with a two step lookup: it first scanned the entire remaining buffer for &, and only when no & existed anywhere ahead did it fall back to scanning for ;. For a body that uses ; as the separator and contains no &, every field iteration performed a full failed & scan over the entire remaining buffer before locating the nearby ;. With N semicolon separated fields in a chunk of size B, this yields O(B^2) byte comparisons per chunk. An attacker can submit a small crafted body of the form a;a;a;... and cause the parser to spend seconds of CPU per request. A handful of concurrent requests can exhaust worker processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.

Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, QuerystringParser treated ; as a field separator in application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, in addition to &. The WHATWG URL standard, modern browsers, and Python's urllib.parse (since the CVE-2021-23336 fix) treat only & as a separator. This creates a parser differential: the same bytes are tokenized into different fields than a WHATWG compliant intermediary would produce, allowing an attacker to smuggle extra form fields past an upstream body inspecting component. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.

Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, parse_options_header parsed Content-Disposition (and Content-Type) headers with email.message.Message, which transparently applies RFC 2231/5987 decoding. The extended parameter syntax (filename*=charset'lang'value, name*=..., and the filename*0/filename*1 continuation form) is decoded and surfaced under the bare filename/name key, and overrides the plain parameter when both are present. RFC 7578 §4.2 explicitly forbids the filename* form in multipart/form-data. Components that follow RFC 7578, or that do not implement RFC 2231/5987 decoding for multipart/form-data (WAFs, proxies, gateways), may interpret such a header differently. An attacker can exploit that difference to smuggle a different field name or filename past an upstream inspector to the backend. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.

AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.0, attacker-controlled input included into multipart/payload headers can be used to modify a request to inject additional headers or similar. In the unlikely situation that an application is passing user-controlled strings into MultipartWriter.append(headers=...) or Payload.headers, then an attacker may be able to modify the request to inject headers or change the contents of the request. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.14.0.