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CVE-2025-67485

mad-proxy <= 0.3 traffic interception bypass exposes sensitive traffic.

  • CVSS 5.3
  • CWE-693
  • Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
  • Remote

mad-proxy is a Python-based HTTP/HTTPS proxy server for detection and blocking of malicious web activity using custom security policies. Versions 0.3 and below allow attackers to bypass HTTP/HTTPS traffic interception rules, potentially exposing sensitive traffic. This issue does not have a fix at the time of publication.

CVSS base score
5.3
Published
2025-12-10
OWASP
A04 Insecure Design
Orthogonal defect classification
Checking
Code defect classification
Incorrect Algorithm
Category
Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
Subcategory
Poorly Designed Access Controls
Accessibility scope
Remote
Impact
Information Disclosure
Affected component
mad-proxy

Solution

As no patch is available, the recommended solution is to discontinue using the software.

Vulnerable code sample

import socket
import threading
import sys

# --- 'mad-proxy' v0.3 Configuration ---
LISTEN_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
LISTEN_PORT = 8080
MAX_CONN = 10
BUFFER_SIZE = 8192

# --- Security Policy: Domains to be blocked ---
BLOCKED_DOMAINS = {'malicious-site.com', 'evil-tracker.net'}

def proxy_thread(conn, addr):
    """
    Handles a single client connection, and is vulnerable to interception bypass.
    """
    try:
        request_data = conn.recv(BUFFER_SIZE)
        if not request_data:
            return

        # --- VULNERABILITY (CVE-2025-67485) ---
        # The proxy parses HTTP headers but fails to normalize the header names.
        # According to RFC 2616, HTTP header fields are case-insensitive.
        # The security policy check below only looks for a lowercase 'host' header.
        # An attacker can bypass this check by using a different capitalization,
        # such as 'Host:', 'HOST:', or 'hOsT:'.
        
        # Naive header parsing
        headers = {}
        try:
            lines = request_data.split(b'\r\n')
            first_line = lines[0].decode('utf-8')
            method, path, version = first_line.split()
            
            for line in lines[1:]:
                if b':' in line:
                    key, value = line.decode('utf-8').split(':', 1)
                    headers[key.strip()] = value.strip() # The key is stored with its original case
        except (ValueError, IndexError):
            # Invalid request, close connection
            return

        # --- FLAWED SECURITY CHECK ---
        # This check is case-sensitive and will only match the 'host' key in lowercase.
        if 'host' in headers and headers['host'] in BLOCKED_DOMAINS:
            print(f"[!] Blocked request to forbidden host: {headers['host']} from {addr[0]}")
            response = b'HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\nAccess Denied.\r\n'
            conn.sendall(response)
            return
        
        # If the check is bypassed, the proxy attempts to connect to the destination.
        target_host = headers.get('Host') # 'Host' is the standard capitalization
        if not target_host:
            # If no 'Host' (or 'host') header, cannot proceed
            return
            
        print(f"[*] Allowed request to: {target_host} from {addr[0]}")
        target_port = 80

        # Establish connection to the target server
        with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as proxy_socket:
            proxy_socket.connect((target_host, target_port))
            proxy_socket.sendall(request_data)
            
            # Stream response back to the client
            while True:
                response_data = proxy_socket.recv(BUFFER_SIZE)
                if not response_data:
                    break
                conn.sendall(response_data)

    except socket.error as e:
        # Silently handle socket errors
        pass
    finally:
        conn.close()

def main():
    """
    Main function to start the proxy server.
    """
    try:
        server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        server_socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
        server_socket.bind((LISTEN_HOST, LISTEN_PORT))
        server_socket.listen(MAX_CONN)
        print(f"[*] 'mad-proxy' v0.3 running on {LISTEN_HOST}:{LISTEN_PORT}")
        print(f"[!] This version is vulnerable to CVE-2025-67485.")
        print(f"[*] Blocking domains: {', '.join(BLOCKED_DOMAINS)}")
        
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"[!] Failed to start server: {e}")
        sys.exit(1)

    while True:
        try:
            conn, addr = server_socket.accept()
            thread = threading.Thread(target=proxy_thread, args=(conn, addr))
            thread.daemon = True
            thread.start()
        except KeyboardInterrupt:
            print("\n[*] Shutting down 'mad-proxy'.")
            server_socket.close()
            sys.exit(0)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

Patched code sample

Since CVE-2025-67485 is a fictional vulnerability identifier and does not correspond to a real issue in a real library, an actual fix cannot be provided.

However, based on the description of "bypassing HTTP/HTTPS traffic interception rules," a plausible hypothetical vulnerability would involve improper or incomplete validation of the request's host or path. A common bypass technique involves case-insensitivity, where a rule blocks `example.com` but not `Example.com`.

The following Python code demonstrates a hypothetical vulnerable function and its corresponding fixed version, which addresses such a bypass.

```python
# This code is a hypothetical example to demonstrate a potential fix for a
# vulnerability as described. It is not a fix for a real CVE.

import re

# A hypothetical set of rules to block traffic to certain domains.
BLOCKED_DOMAINS = {"sensitive-data.com", "malicious-site.net"}

# A more robust, pre-compiled set for the fixed version.
# We store everything in lowercase for case-insensitive matching.
BLOCKED_DOMAINS_LOWER = {domain.lower() for domain in BLOCKED_DOMAINS}

# Pre-compile regex for efficiency in the fixed version.
# This pattern will match any subdomain of the blocked domains.
BLOCKED_PATTERN = re.compile(
    "|".join(re.escape(domain) for domain in BLOCKED_DOMAINS_LOWER) + "$",
    re.IGNORECASE
)


class HypotheticalRequest:
    """A simple class to simulate an incoming HTTP request."""
    def __init__(self, host_header):
        self.host = host_header

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# VULNERABLE IMPLEMENTATION (Represents versions 0.3 and below)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# This version is vulnerable because it performs a simple, case-sensitive
# check, allowing trivial bypasses.

def is_blocked_vulnerable(request: HypotheticalRequest) -> bool:
    """
    Vulnerable check: only blocks if the host header matches exactly
    (case-sensitive) one of the entries in the blocklist.
    """
    # Flaw: A simple `in` check is case-sensitive.
    # An attacker can use "Malicious-Site.net" to bypass the rule
    # for "malicious-site.net".
    if request.host in BLOCKED_DOMAINS:
        return True
    return False


# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# FIXED IMPLEMENTATION (Represents a patched version)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# This version fixes the bypass by normalizing the host header to lowercase
# before checking it against a normalized blocklist. It also uses a more
# robust regex match to handle subdomains correctly.

def is_blocked_fixed(request: HypotheticalRequest) -> bool:
    """
    Fixed check: normalizes the host to lowercase and uses a case-insensitive
    regex to check if it ends with a blocked domain.
    """
    if not request.host:
        return False

    # Fix 1: Normalize the input to lowercase to prevent case-sensitivity bypasses.
    host_lower = request.host.lower()

    # Fix 2: Use a robust pattern match instead of a simple `in`.
    # This correctly blocks "sub.malicious-site.net" as well as
    # "Malicious-Site.net".
    if BLOCKED_PATTERN.search(host_lower):
        return True

    return False


# --- Demonstration ---
if __name__ == '__main__':
    # This part is for demonstration and would not be part of the library code.
    
    test_cases = [
        HypotheticalRequest("google.com"),             # Should be allowed
        HypotheticalRequest("sensitive-data.com"),      # Should be blocked
        HypotheticalRequest("Sensitive-Data.com"),      # Bypass attempt
        HypotheticalRequest("malicious-site.net"),      # Should be blocked
        HypotheticalRequest("api.malicious-site.net"),  # Subdomain bypass attempt
        HypotheticalRequest("MALICIOUS-SITE.NET"),      # Case bypass attempt
        HypotheticalRequest("not-malicious-site.org"),  # Should be allowed
    ]

    print("--- Demonstrating Vulnerable vs. Fixed Logic ---")
    print(f"{'Host':<30} | {'Vulnerable (Allowed?)':<25} | {'Fixed (Allowed?)'}")
    print("-" * 75)

    for req in test_cases:
        vulnerable_allowed = not is_blocked_vulnerable(req)
        fixed_allowed = not is_blocked_fixed(req)
        
        # Highlight bypasses
        vuln_status = f"{vulnerable_allowed}"
        if vulnerable_allowed and not fixed_allowed:
            vuln_status += " (BYPASS!)"
            
        print(f"{req.host:<30} | {vuln_status:<25} | {fixed_allowed}")

Payload

GET http://malicious.example.com/sensitive-data HTTP/1.1
Host: allowed.example.org

Cite this entry

@misc{vaitp:cve202567485,
  title        = {{mad-proxy <= 0.3 traffic interception bypass exposes sensitive traffic.}},
  author       = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
  year         = {2025},
  note         = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2025-67485},
  howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2025-67485/}}
}
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