CVE-2026-100689
GitPython 3.1.61 allows path traversal via untrusted .gitmodules, leading to arbitrary directory creation/deletion.
- CVSS 8.7
- CWE-22
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name() to constrain the `name` field, and GitPython's own containment guard Submodule._to_relative_path() is applied in add() and move(), Submodule.update() derives the absolute checkout location from the raw `path` value without that guard. A .gitmodules entry containing directory traversal components (e.g., path = ../../../tmp/escaped) can therefore cause directories to be created via os.makedirs() outside the repository working tree, populated from the submodule URL on the clone path, and removed via shutil.rmtree() when force_remove is used. Exploitation requires an application flow that updates submodules at a non-HEAD commit (such as a historical-commit API); the common clone-then-update flow re-derives the path from a canonical tree lookup and is not affected. The issue is fixed in GitPython 3.1.62.
- CWE
- CWE-22
- CVSS base score
- 8.7
- Published
- 2026-09-26
- OWASP
- A04 Insecure Design
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Path Traversal
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Arbitrary Code Execution
- Affected component
- GitPython
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade GitPython to version 3.1.62 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
from git import Repo, Submodule
def update_submodule(repo_path: str, submodule_name: str) -> None:
"""Update a submodule without validating its path."""
repo = Repo(repo_path)
# VULNERABLE: uses raw submodule.path from .gitmodules allowing path traversal
sub = repo.submodule(submodule_name)
target_path = os.path.join(repo.working_tree_dir, sub.path) # may escape repo
if not os.path.isdir(target_path):
os.makedirs(target_path)
sub.update(init=True, force=True)Patched code sample
import os
from git import Repo, Submodule
def update_submodule(repo_path: str, submodule_name: str) -> None:
"""Update a submodule with path validation to prevent traversal."""
repo = Repo(repo_path)
# FIX: normalize and ensure submodule path stays within the repository
sub = repo.submodule(submodule_name)
normalized = os.path.normpath(sub.path)
if normalized.startswith('..') or os.path.isabs(normalized):
raise ValueError("Submodule path traversal detected")
target_path = os.path.join(repo.working_tree_dir, normalized)
if not os.path.isdir(target_path):
os.makedirs(target_path)
sub.update(init=True, force=True)Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- Reject submodule checkout paths outside the repository (gitpython-developers/GitPython)
git/objects/submodule/base.py
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve2026100689,
title = {{GitPython 3.1.61 allows path traversal via untrusted .gitmodules, leading to arbitrary directory creation/deletion.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-100689},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-100689/}}
}
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