CVE-2026-100863
SSRF in Heym < 0.0.91: image loader fetches unguarded URLs & IPv6 bypasses egress pin.
- CVSS 5.3
- CWE-918
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports "imageInput": "$userInput.body.imageUrl", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.
- CWE
- CWE-918
- CVSS base score
- 5.3
- Published
- 2026-09-27
- OWASP
- A10 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Unauthorized Access
- Affected component
- app/services/ssrf_guard.py
Solution
Upgrade to Heym 0.0.91 (or later), which includes the SSRF guard fixes.
Vulnerable code sample
import httpx
from urllib.parse import urlparse
def _load_image_bytes(url: str) -> bytes:
# VULNERABLE: direct httpx.get without egress guard
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise ValueError("Invalid scheme")
resp = httpx.get(url, timeout=5.0)
resp.raise_for_status()
return resp.contentPatched code sample
import httpx
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from app.services.ssrf_guard import guard_http_url, guarded_client
def _load_image_bytes(url: str) -> bytes:
# FIX: route through guard_http_url and guarded_client
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise ValueError("Invalid scheme")
safe_url = guard_http_url(url) # validates against private/RFC1918/NAT64 etc.
resp = guarded_client.get(safe_url, timeout=5.0)
resp.raise_for_status()
return resp.contentCite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve2026100863,
title = {{SSRF in Heym < 0.0.91: image loader fetches unguarded URLs & IPv6 bypasses egress pin.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-100863},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-100863/}}
}
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