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CVE-2026-106441

Hydra logging config can load arbitrary classes, enabling code execution.

  • CVSS 7.8
  • CWE-94
  • Configuration Issues
  • Local

Hydra is a framework for elegantly configuring complex applications. Prior to 1.3.6 and 1.4.0.dev9, Hydra passes Python logging configuration to logging.config.dictConfig() without applying Hydra's target policy to handler class values or formatter, filter, handler, queue, and listener factories. An attacker who controls Hydra logging configuration can therefore select an importable class or factory and cause it to be invoked with the application's privileges, even in versions where instantiate() is protected because the logging path does not use instantiate(). This issue is fixed in versions 1.3.6 and 1.4.0.dev9.

CVSS base score
7.8
Published
2026-10-06
OWASP
A08 Software and Data Integrity Failures
Orthogonal defect classification
Interface
Code defect classification
Incorrect Interface
Category
Configuration Issues
Subcategory
Dynamic Link Library (DLL) Loading Issues
Accessibility scope
Local
Impact
Arbitrary Code Execution
Affected component
Hydra
Fixed by upgrading
Yes

Solution

Upgrade Hydra to version 1.3.6 or later (or to 1.4.0.dev9 or newer).

Vulnerable code sample

import logging
import logging.config
from omegaconf import OmegaConf

def configure_logging(cfg_path: str):
    # Load a YAML logging configuration supplied by the user
    user_cfg = OmegaConf.load(cfg_path)
    # VULNERABLE: passes unvalidated dict directly to dictConfig, allowing arbitrary class import
    logging.config.dictConfig(OmegaConf.to_container(user_cfg, resolve=True))

def main():
    configure_logging("logging.yaml")

Patched code sample

import logging
import logging.config
from omegaconf import OmegaConf

# Allowed handler classes for logging configuration
_ALLOWED_HANDLER_CLASSES = {
    "logging.StreamHandler",
    "logging.FileHandler",
    "logging.handlers.RotatingFileHandler",
    "logging.handlers.QueueHandler",
}

def _validate_logging_cfg(cfg: dict) -> dict:
    handlers = cfg.get("handlers", {})
    for name, handler_cfg in handlers.items():
        cls = handler_cfg.get("class")
        if cls not in _ALLOWED_HANDLER_CLASSES:
            raise ValueError(f"Disallowed logging handler class: {cls}")
    return cfg

def configure_logging(cfg_path: str):
    user_cfg = OmegaConf.load(cfg_path)
    raw_cfg = OmegaConf.to_container(user_cfg, resolve=True)
    # FIX: validates handler classes before passing to dictConfig
    safe_cfg = _validate_logging_cfg(raw_cfg)
    logging.config.dictConfig(safe_cfg)

def main():
    configure_logging("logging.yaml")

Published fix

Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.

  • Apply target authorization to logging configuration (hydra-ecosystem/hydra)
    hydra/core/utils.py, hydra/core/utils.py · configure_log, hydra/core/utils.py · run_job, hydra/main.py, hydra/main.py · main, hydra/types.py, hydra/utils.py, hydra/_internal/core_plugins/basic_launcher.py · BasicLauncher.launch, hydra/_internal/hydra.py, hydra/_internal/hydra.py · Hydra.multirun, hydra/_internal/hydra.py · Hydra.run, hydra/_internal/instantiate/_instantiate2.py and 6 more
  • Harden logging target resolution on 1.3 (#3420) (hydra-ecosystem/hydra)
    hydra/core/utils.py · configure_log, hydra/_internal/instantiate/_instantiate2.py, hydra/_internal/instantiate/_instantiate2.py · _resolve_target

Cite this entry

@misc{vaitp:cve2026106441,
  title        = {{Hydra logging config can load arbitrary classes, enabling code execution.}},
  author       = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
  year         = {2026},
  note         = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-106441},
  howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-106441/}}
}

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