CVE-2026-110860
Symlink-following flaw in GitPython Submodule.move() allows path traversal via crafted symlinks.
- CVSS 6.9
- CWE-59
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Local
GitPython from 3.1.62 before 3.2.0 contains a symlink-following flaw in Submodule.move(), which checks the destination only lexically and does not reject symbolic links in intermediate path components. An untrusted repository can commit a symlink such as vendor pointing outside the worktree, so an application moving an initialized submodule beneath it relocates the checkout externally and corrupts the index and .gitmodules.
- CWE
- CWE-59
- CVSS base score
- 6.9
- Published
- 2026-10-14
- OWASP
- A01 Broken Access Control
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Path Traversal
- Accessibility scope
- Local
- Impact
- Unauthorized Access
- Affected component
- GitPython
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade GitPython to version 3.2.0 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
from git import Repo
def relocate_submodule(repo_path: str, submodule_name: str, new_path: str) -> None:
"""Move a submodule to a new location inside the worktree."""
repo = Repo(repo_path)
submodule = repo.submodule(submodule_name)
# VULNERABLE: does not verify that intermediate components are not symlinks
submodule.move(new_path)Patched code sample
import os
from git import Repo
def relocate_submodule(repo_path: str, submodule_name: str, new_path: str) -> None:
"""Move a submodule to a new location inside the worktree."""
repo = Repo(repo_path)
submodule = repo.submodule(submodule_name)
# FIX: resolve symlinks and ensure the target stays within the worktree
target = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(repo.working_tree_dir, new_path))
if not target.startswith(os.path.realpath(repo.working_tree_dir) + os.sep):
raise ValueError("Target path escapes repository")
submodule.move(new_path)Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- fix: Reject submodule move destinations through intermediate symlinks (gitpython-developers/GitPython)
git/objects/submodule/base.py,git/objects/submodule/base.py · Submodule.abspath,git/objects/submodule/base.py · Submodule.move
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve2026110860,
title = {{Symlink-following flaw in GitPython Submodule.move() allows path traversal via crafted symlinks.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-110860},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-110860/}}
}
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