CVE-2026-115522
App‑to‑app artifact leakage: shared root lets one app access another’s files.
- CVSS 5.3
- CWE-668
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Local
Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere (CWE-668) in FileArtifactService in Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) for Python (google-adk) versions 1.19.0 before 1.39.1 and 2.0.0a1 before 2.7.0 allows a caller in one application to list, read, overwrite, or delete artifacts belonging to another application when both applications share a FileArtifactService root directory and use the same user_id (and session_id for session-scoped artifacts). FileArtifactService accepted app_name across its public API methods but omitted app_name when constructing on-disk paths (root/users/{user_id}/… instead of root/apps/{app_name}/users/{user_id}/…). Version 2.6.0 scoped writes by app_name but retained a legacy root/users/{user_id} fallback for reads and deletes; version 2.7.0 and the 1.x backport in version 1.39.1 removed the fallback and enforce full per-app path scoping.
- CWE
- CWE-668
- CVSS base score
- 5.3
- Published
- 2026-10-28
- OWASP
- A01 Broken Access Control
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Interface
- Code defect classification
- Incorrect Interface
- Category
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Subcategory
- Privilege Escalation
- Accessibility scope
- Local
- Impact
- Unauthorized Access
- Affected component
- google-adk
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade to google‑adk 1.39.1 (or later) or google‑adk 2.7.0 (or later) to obtain the fix.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
class FileArtifactService:
def __init__(self, root_dir):
self.root = root_dir
def _artifact_path(self, user_id, artifact_name):
# VULNERABLE: omits app_name, allowing cross‑app access
return os.path.join(self.root, "users", user_id, artifact_name)
def write_artifact(self, app_name, user_id, artifact_name, data):
path = self._artifact_path(user_id, artifact_name)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
with open(path, "wb") as f:
f.write(data)
def read_artifact(self, app_name, user_id, artifact_name):
path = self._artifact_path(user_id, artifact_name)
with open(path, "rb") as f:
return f.read()Patched code sample
import os
class FileArtifactService:
def __init__(self, root_dir):
self.root = root_dir
def _artifact_path(self, app_name, user_id, artifact_name):
# FIX: include app_name in path to enforce per‑app isolation
return os.path.join(self.root, "apps", app_name, "users", user_id, artifact_name)
def write_artifact(self, app_name, user_id, artifact_name, data):
path = self._artifact_path(app_name, user_id, artifact_name)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
with open(path, "wb") as f:
f.write(data)
def read_artifact(self, app_name, user_id, artifact_name):
path = self._artifact_path(app_name, user_id, artifact_name)
with open(path, "rb") as f:
return f.read()Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- fix(artifacts): Port app-scoped file artifact storage and layout-derived payload paths to v1 (#6795) (google/adk-python)
src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService.delete_artifact,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService.get_artifact_version,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService.list_artifact_keys,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService.list_artifact_versions,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService.list_versions,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService.load_artifact,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService.save_artifact,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._artifact_dir,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._base_root,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._build_artifact_version,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._delete_artifact_syncand 10 more - fix: scope file artifact reads and deletes to the requesting app (google/adk-python)
src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._artifact_dir,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._delete_artifact_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._get_artifact_version_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._list_artifact_keys_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._list_artifact_versions_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._list_versions_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._load_artifact_sync - fix(artifacts): namespace file artifacts by app (google/adk-python)
src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._artifact_dir,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._build_artifact_version,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._delete_artifact_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._get_artifact_version_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._list_artifact_keys_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._list_artifact_versions_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._list_versions_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._load_artifact_sync,src/google/adk/artifacts/file_artifact_service.py · FileArtifactService._save_artifact_sync
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve2026115522,
title = {{App‑to‑app artifact leakage: shared root lets one app access another’s files.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-115522},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-115522/}}
}
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