CVE-2026-123816
API key cache bypass via key_id allowing unauthorized access
- CVSS 8.1
- CWE-287
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Remote
pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev101, Api.check_apikey caches successful validation in self._apikey_cache using only the attacker-controlled key_id. After a legitimate key populates the cache, a forged API key with the same key_id reaches the cache-hit path without comparing apikey[-43:] to the stored hash through hmac.compare_digest. Key identifiers are small sequential integers, so an unauthenticated remote attacker can enumerate an active identifier and inherit the cached key owner's permissions during the 300-second cache lifetime. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0b3.dev101.
- CWE
- CWE-287
- CVSS base score
- 8.1
- Published
- 2026-11-09
- OWASP
- A07 Identification and Authentication Failures
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Subcategory
- Insecure Authentication Mechanisms
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Privilege Escalation
- Affected component
- pyLoad
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade pyLoad to version 0.5.0b3.dev101 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import hmac
class Api:
def __init__(self):
# cache maps key_id -> True (validation passed)
self._apikey_cache = {}
def check_apikey(self, apikey: str) -> bool:
"""
Validate an API key. The key format is "<key_id>:<secret_hash>"
where <secret_hash> is the last 43 characters of an HMAC.
"""
try:
key_id, secret = apikey.split(":", 1)
except ValueError:
return False
# VULNERABLE: cache keyed only by attacker‑controlled key_id
if key_id in self._apikey_cache:
return True
# Simulated verification against a data store
stored_hash = self._lookup_hash(key_id)
if stored_hash is None:
return False
# compare the provided secret to the stored hash
if hmac.compare_digest(secret, stored_hash):
self._apikey_cache[key_id] = True
return True
return False
def _lookup_hash(self, key_id: str) -> str | None:
# Placeholder for DB lookup; returns the last 43 chars of the true HMAC
fake_db = {
"1": "a"*43,
"2": "b"*43,
}
return fake_db.get(key_id)Patched code sample
import hmac
class Api:
def __init__(self):
# cache maps key_id -> stored_hash (validation passed)
self._apikey_cache = {}
def check_apikey(self, apikey: str) -> bool:
"""
Validate an API key. The key format is "<key_id>:<secret_hash>"
where <secret_hash> is the last 43 characters of an HMAC.
"""
try:
key_id, secret = apikey.split(":", 1)
except ValueError:
return False
# FIX: cache includes the validated hash, ensuring secret is re‑checked
cached_hash = self._apikey_cache.get(key_id)
if cached_hash is not None and hmac.compare_digest(secret, cached_hash):
return True
stored_hash = self._lookup_hash(key_id)
if stored_hash is None:
return False
if hmac.compare_digest(secret, stored_hash):
self._apikey_cache[key_id] = stored_hash
return True
return False
def _lookup_hash(self, key_id: str) -> str | None:
fake_db = {
"1": "a"*43,
"2": "b"*43,
}
return fake_db.get(key_id)Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- fix GHSA-r44w-v6gf-x3p6 security advisory (pyload/pyload)
src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py · Api.check_apikey,src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py · Api.delete_apikey,src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py · Api.remove_user,src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py · Api.__init__,src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py · apikey_auth
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve2026123816,
title = {{API key cache bypass via key_id allowing unauthorized access}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-123816},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-123816/}}
}
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