CVE-2026-130161
Authenticated SSRF via DNS rebinding in recipe‑autofill URL feature.
- CVSS 5.3
- CWE-918
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework. Prior to 1.7.2, an authenticated user can bypass the recipe-autofill SSRF check by submitting a hostname under the user's control through the Autofill from URL feature; the hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and a private or internal address during the later connection. In app/myrecipes/routes.py, is_safe_autofill_url validates the first DNS response, but recipe autofill passes the original URL to requests.get, which independently resolves the hostname and can connect to the internal address. The fetched response is parsed into recipe fields, enabling internal-service reconnaissance and potential data exposure; no redirect is required, and disabling redirects does not stop this DNS-rebinding bypass. This issue is fixed in 1.7.2.
- CWE
- CWE-918
- CVSS base score
- 5.3
- Published
- 2026-11-19
- OWASP
- A10 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Incorrect Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Insecure Parsing or Deserialization
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Information Disclosure
- Affected component
- Flask
Solution
Upgrade Tamari to version 1.7.2 or later, which patches the SSRF bypass.
Vulnerable code sample
import re
import socket
import requests
from flask import Blueprint, request, abort, jsonify
myrecipes = Blueprint('myrecipes', __name__)
PRIVATE_NETS = [
re.compile(r'^10\.'),
re.compile(r'^192\.168\.'),
re.compile(r'^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.')
]
def is_safe_autofill_url(url: str) -> bool:
try:
hostname = re.sub(r'^https?://', '', url).split('/')[0]
ip = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)[0][4][0]
for net in PRIVATE_NETS:
if net.match(ip):
return False
return True
except Exception:
return False
@myrecipes.route('/autofill', methods=['POST'])
def autofill():
data = request.get_json()
url = data.get('url')
if not url or not is_safe_autofill_url(url):
abort(400, 'Invalid URL')
# VULNERABLE: uses original URL which may resolve to a private address later
resp = requests.get(url, timeout=5)
if resp.status_code != 200:
abort(502, 'Failed to fetch recipe')
recipe = resp.json()
return jsonify(recipe)Patched code sample
import re
import socket
import requests
from flask import Blueprint, request, abort, jsonify
myrecipes = Blueprint('myrecipes', __name__)
PRIVATE_NETS = [
re.compile(r'^10\.'),
re.compile(r'^192\.168\.'),
re.compile(r'^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.')
]
def is_safe_autofill_url(url: str) -> bool:
try:
hostname = re.sub(r'^https?://', '', url).split('/')[0]
ip = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)[0][4][0]
for net in PRIVATE_NETS:
if net.match(ip):
return False
return True
except Exception:
return False
@myrecipes.route('/autofill', methods=['POST'])
def autofill():
data = request.get_json()
url = data.get('url')
if not url or not is_safe_autofill_url(url):
abort(400, 'Invalid URL')
# FIX: resolve hostname again and ensure it matches the safe address before fetching
hostname = re.sub(r'^https?://', '', url).split('/')[0]
safe_ip = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)[0][4][0]
for net in PRIVATE_NETS:
if net.match(safe_ip):
abort(400, 'URL resolves to private address')
resp = requests.get(url, timeout=5)
if resp.status_code != 200:
abort(502, 'Failed to fetch recipe')
recipe = resp.json()
return jsonify(recipe)Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- Fix SSRF DNS rebinding vulnerability (alexbates/Tamari)
app/myrecipes/routes.py,app/myrecipes/routes.py · addRecipe
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve2026130161,
title = {{Authenticated SSRF via DNS rebinding in recipe‑autofill URL feature.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-130161},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-130161/}}
}
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