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CVE-2026-15925

Improper TLS hostname verification in Snowflake Python Connector allows MITM.

  • CVSS 9.2
  • CWE-297
  • Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
  • Remote

Improper TLS hostname verification in Snowflake Connector for Python versions prior to 4.7.1 may have allowed a network-positioned attacker to bypass certificate hostname validation on HTTPS connections made by the connector. An attacker with on-path network access could exploit this by intercepting or redirecting network traffic and presenting a certificate signed by any trusted CA for any domain, causing the connector to accept connections without validating that the certificate matched the requested hostname. Successful exploitation requires an on-path traffic interception capability (e.g. ARP/DNS poisoning, rogue access point, BGP hijacking, or malicious proxy/exit node). This vulnerability may have exposed credentials, query data, and staged file contents to interception and tampering, and may have enabled the attacker to issue arbitrary SQL within the context of the victim's connector session. Impact is limited by the privileges of the affected Snowflake role. The fix is available in Snowflake Connector for Python version 4.7.1. Users must manually upgrade.

CVSS base score
9.2
Published
2026-07-16
OWASP
A02 Cryptographic Failures
Orthogonal defect classification
Checking
Code defect classification
Missing Check
Category
Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
Subcategory
Improper SSL/TLS Certificate Validation
Accessibility scope
Remote
Impact
Unauthorized Access
Affected component
Snowflake Co
Fixed by upgrading
Yes

Solution

Upgrade Snowflake Connector for Python to version 4.7.1 or later.

Vulnerable code sample

import ssl
import urllib.request

def vulnerable_snowflake_connect(host, account, user, password):
    """
    A representative example of the vulnerable connection logic.
    The actual library code is more complex but this demonstrates the flaw.
    """
    url = f"https://{account}.{host}"

    # The core of the vulnerability: An SSL context is created that
    # correctly validates the certificate chain against a trusted CA,
    # but it explicitly disables hostname verification.
    # This allows a network attacker to present a valid certificate for
    # *any* domain, and the client will accept it.
    vulnerable_ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context()
    vulnerable_ssl_context.check_hostname = False
    # Note: vulnerable_ssl_context.verify_mode remains ssl.CERT_REQUIRED,
    # so the certificate chain is still checked, just not the hostname.

    try:
        # The user's request is made using the insecure SSL context.
        # In a real man-in-the-middle attack, this connection would succeed,
        # exposing credentials, query data, and results to the attacker.
        request = urllib.request.Request(url)
        
        # In the real connector, authentication and session logic would follow.
        # For this example, we just attempt to open the connection.
        urllib.request.urlopen(
            request,
            context=vulnerable_ssl_context,
            timeout=10
        )
        
        # This return value represents a successful connection object.
        return True

    except Exception:
        # This block would handle network errors or legitimate TLS failures
        # (e.g., an untrusted or expired certificate), but not the
        # hostname mismatch failure.
        return False

Patched code sample

import ssl
import requests
from requests.adapters import HTTPAdapter
from urllib3.poolmanager import PoolManager

# This code represents how a fix for a TLS hostname verification vulnerability,
# such as the one described in CVE-2026-15925, would be implemented.
# The vulnerability stems from not checking if the server's certificate
# hostname matches the hostname the client is connecting to.
# The fix is to ensure hostname checking is explicitly enabled.

class SnowflakeSecureHttpAdapter(HTTPAdapter):
    """
    A custom requests HTTP Adapter that enforces secure TLS settings,
    specifically ensuring hostname verification is enabled.
    """
    def init_poolmanager(self, connections, maxsize, block=False, **pool_kwargs):
        """
        Creates a PoolManager that enforces secure TLS settings.
        """
        # The core of the fix is creating a proper SSL/TLS context.
        # ssl.create_default_context() provides a secure baseline for client sockets.
        # By default, it sets:
        # 1. `verify_mode` to `ssl.CERT_REQUIRED`.
        # 2. `check_hostname` to `True`.
        #
        # The vulnerable code would have likely used a context where
        # `check_hostname` was set to `False`, or used an older, less secure
        # method of context creation that did not enable it by default.
        ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context()
        
        # This explicit re-affirmation is for clarity and defense-in-depth,
        # ensuring the critical security feature is active. This directly
        # mitigates the risk of a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack where
        # an attacker presents a valid certificate for a different domain.
        ssl_context.check_hostname = True
        ssl_context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED

        # Attach the secure context to the pool manager.
        self.poolmanager = PoolManager(
            num_pools=connections,
            maxsize=maxsize,
            block=block,
            ssl_context=ssl_context,
            **pool_kwargs
        )

# --- Example Usage (demonstrating how the fixed connector would use it) ---

# In the fixed Snowflake Connector (e.g., version 4.7.1 or later), the
# internal HTTP session would be configured to use this secure adapter.

def create_fixed_snowflake_session(snowflake_host):
    """
    Creates a requests.Session object configured with the secure adapter.
    This simulates the corrected behavior in the Snowflake Connector.
    """
    session = requests.Session()
    secure_adapter = SnowflakeSecureHttpAdapter()
    
    # Mount the secure adapter for all HTTPS connections.
    session.mount(f"https://{snowflake_host}", secure_adapter)
    
    return session

if __name__ == '__main__':
    # This example demonstrates making a request with the fixed configuration.
    # An attacker attempting a MITM attack against this client would fail
    # because the client would reject the attacker's certificate if its
    # hostname did not match 'my-account.snowflakecomputing.com'.
    
    SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT_HOST = "my-account.snowflakecomputing.com"
    
    # Create a session that enforces hostname verification.
    secure_session = create_fixed_snowflake_session(SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT_HOST)
    
    login_url = f"https://{SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT_HOST}/session/v1/login-request"
    
    print(f"Attempting to connect to {login_url} with secure TLS settings...")
    
    try:
        # This request will now correctly validate the certificate AND hostname.
        # NOTE: This is a conceptual example; a real login requires a POST with data.
        response = secure_session.get(login_url, timeout=5)
        print("Connection successful (or received expected server response).")
        print(f"Status Code: {response.status_code}")
    except requests.exceptions.SSLError as e:
        # This is the error that would occur during a MITM attack with a
        # mismatched hostname, proving the fix is working.
        print(f"SSL Error occurred, as expected during a MITM attack: {e}")
    except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e:
        print(f"A network error occurred: {e}")

Payload

I cannot provide a payload or code to exploit this vulnerability. Generating code for exploiting security vulnerabilities, such as setting up a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, is against my safety guidelines as it can be used for malicious purposes.

The exploit for CVE-2026-15925 is not a traditional payload (like a string of characters or a script injected into an input field). Instead, it involves a multi-step, network-level attack that cannot be represented by a single piece of code sent to the victim. The attack requires:

1.  **Network Interception:** The attacker must first position themselves between the victim and the Snowflake service (e.g., through DNS poisoning, a rogue Wi-Fi access point, or BGP hijacking).
2.  **Malicious Server/Proxy:** The attacker must run a server that intercepts the TLS connection attempt.
3.  **Mismatched Certificate:** This server would present a TLS certificate that is valid and signed by a trusted Certificate Authority, but for a domain controlled by the attacker (e.g., `attacker-domain.com`), not the legitimate Snowflake domain (`your-account.snowflakecomputing.com`).

The vulnerability is the client's failure to check that the hostname on the certificate matches the hostname it was trying to connect to. Therefore, there is no "payload code" to provide in the way one would for a SQL injection or cross-site scripting attack. Providing the tools or scripts to perform the network interception and proxying would facilitate harmful activity.

Cite this entry

@misc{vaitp:cve202615925,
  title        = {{Improper TLS hostname verification in Snowflake Python Connector allows MITM.}},
  author       = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
  year         = {2026},
  note         = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-15925},
  howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-15925/}}
}
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