CVE-2026-31831
Tautulli < 2.17.0 allows unauthenticated file read via path traversal.
- CVSS 8.7
- CWE-23
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. Prior to version 2.17.0, the /newsletter/image/images API endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the application server's filesystem. This issue has been patched in version 2.17.0.
- CWE
- CWE-23
- CVSS base score
- 8.7
- Published
- 2026-03-30
- OWASP
- A01 Broken Access Control
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Path Traversal
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Information Disclosure
- Affected component
- Tautulli
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade Tautulli to version 2.17.0 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
from flask import Flask, send_file, abort
app = Flask(__name__)
# This is a representative example of the vulnerable code pattern.
# The actual base path may differ.
NEWSLETTER_IMAGE_BASE_PATH = '/app/data/newsletter_images/'
@app.route('/newsletter/image/images/<path:filename>')
def get_newsletter_image(filename):
# VULNERABILITY: The user-supplied 'filename' is directly joined with
# a base path without any sanitization. An attacker can use '..'
# sequences to traverse the filesystem and access arbitrary files.
# Example malicious request: GET /newsletter/image/images/../../../../../etc/passwd
image_path = os.path.join(NEWSLETTER_IMAGE_BASE_PATH, filename)
# The application proceeds to serve the file from the constructed path.
# The check for existence happens on the potentially malicious path.
if not os.path.isfile(image_path):
abort(404, description="Image not found.")
try:
return send_file(image_path)
except Exception:
abort(500, description="Error reading file.")Patched code sample
import os
import werkzeug.utils
def get_safe_newsletter_image_path(base_directory, unsafe_filename):
"""
Represents the patched logic to prevent path traversal.
The vulnerability existed because `unsafe_filename` was directly joined with
the base directory path. An attacker could provide a filename like
'../../../../etc/passwd' to read arbitrary files.
The fix involves sanitizing the filename to remove any directory components
before joining it with the base path. This ensures that the file access
is restricted to the intended `base_directory`. The werkzeug.utils.secure_filename
is a robust way to achieve this, but os.path.basename achieves a similar goal
by stripping directory information.
Args:
base_directory (str): The trusted root directory where images are stored.
unsafe_filename (str): The untrusted filename from user input.
Returns:
str: A safe, absolute file path that is confirmed to be within the
base_directory. Returns the base_directory path if filename is malicious.
"""
# FIX: Sanitize the user-provided filename to remove directory traversal
# characters and sequences. werkzeug.utils.secure_filename is a common
# and robust method in web applications for this purpose.
# An input like '../../../../etc/passwd' becomes 'etc_passwd'.
safe_filename = werkzeug.utils.secure_filename(unsafe_filename)
# Construct the full path using the now-safe filename.
safe_filepath = os.path.join(base_directory, safe_filename)
# For added security (defense-in-depth), resolve the real path and check
# if it is truly within the intended base directory.
if os.path.commonprefix((os.path.realpath(safe_filepath), os.path.realpath(base_directory))) != os.path.realpath(base_directory):
# If the path somehow escaped, do not proceed.
# This could happen if secure_filename has a flaw or is bypassed.
return os.path.realpath(base_directory)
# The resulting path is now safe to use for file operations.
return safe_filepathPayload
/newsletter/image/images/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202631831,
title = {{Tautulli < 2.17.0 allows unauthenticated file read via path traversal.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-31831},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-31831/}}
}
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