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CVE-2026-44716

Path traversal in Pipecat's dev runner allows unauthenticated file read.

  • CVSS 7.5
  • CWE-22
  • Input Validation and Sanitization
  • Remote

Pipecat is an open-source Python framework for building real-time voice and multimodal conversational agents. From version 0.0.90 to before version 1.2.0, a path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the –folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded after routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.0.

CVSS base score
7.5
Published
2026-06-10
OWASP
A01 Broken Access Control
Orthogonal defect classification
Checking
Code defect classification
Missing Check
Category
Input Validation and Sanitization
Subcategory
Path Traversal
Accessibility scope
Remote
Impact
Information Disclosure
Affected component
Pipecat
Fixed by upgrading
Yes

Solution

Upgrade Pipecat to version 1.2.0 or later.

Vulnerable code sample

import os
import argparse
import uvicorn
from starlette.applications import Starlette
from starlette.responses import FileResponse, Response
from starlette.routing import Route
from starlette.requests import Request

# This handler represents the vulnerable code from src/pipecat/runner/run.py
async def download_file(request: Request):
    # The base folder is taken from the command-line arguments.
    base_folder = request.app.state.folder
    # The filename is taken directly from the URL path.
    filename = request.path_params['filename']

    # VULNERABILITY: The untrusted 'filename' is directly joined with the
    # base folder path without any sanitization or containment checks.
    # An attacker can use URL-encoded path traversal sequences like '..%2F'
    # to access files outside the intended 'base_folder' directory.
    file_path = os.path.join(base_folder, filename)

    if os.path.isfile(file_path):
        return FileResponse(file_path)
    return Response("File not found", status_code=404)

# This block simulates the runner's setup process.
if __name__ == "__main__":
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    # The '--folder' flag is required to expose the vulnerable endpoint.
    parser.add_argument("--folder", default=".", help="Path to the folder to serve files from")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    app = Starlette(routes=[
        Route("/files/{filename:path}", download_file, methods=["GET"]),
    ])
    # The folder path is stored in the application state, accessible by the handler.
    app.state.folder = os.path.abspath(args.folder)

    uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=8000)

Patched code sample

import os
from fastapi import FastAPI
from starlette.responses import Response, FileResponse

# This is a simplified representation. In the actual code, `args` would
# come from command-line arguments (e.g., argparse).
class Args:
    folder: str

args = Args()
args.folder = "/path/to/web/files" # Example base directory

app = FastAPI()

@app.get("/files/{filename:path}")
async def get_file(filename: str):
    # IMPORTANT: Sanitize the filename to prevent path traversal.
    # We do this by ensuring the resolved path is inside args.folder.
    try:
        # Get the real, canonical path for the base directory
        base_dir = os.path.realpath(args.folder)
        # Get the real, canonical path for the requested file
        requested_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_dir, filename))
    except ValueError:
        # os.path.realpath can raise ValueError on Windows for invalid paths
        return Response("Invalid path", status_code=400)

    # Check if the resolved requested path is still within the base directory
    if not requested_path.startswith(base_dir + os.sep) and requested_path != base_dir:
        return Response("Invalid path", status_code=400)

    # Check if the path exists and is a file
    if not os.path.exists(requested_path) or not os.path.isfile(requested_path):
        return Response("Not Found", status_code=404)

    return FileResponse(requested_path)

Payload

curl http://<target-ip>:<port>/files/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd

Cite this entry

@misc{vaitp:cve202644716,
  title        = {{Path traversal in Pipecat's dev runner allows unauthenticated file read.}},
  author       = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
  year         = {2026},
  note         = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-44716},
  howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-44716/}}
}
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