CVE-2026-48484
Unbounded memory consumption via multipart upload leading to DoS.
- CVSS 6.5
- CWE-20
- Resource Management
- Remote
pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev101, the API `rpc` function in `api_blueprint.py` handles `multipart/form-data` uploads by reading the whole content of the uploaded file into memory with `file.read()`. This occurs before the data is sent to the underlying function. Since there is no size limit set at this point, a large file upload can exhaust the server's available memory which led to process termination. Version 0.5.0b3.dev101 contains a patch.
- CWE
- CWE-20
- CVSS base score
- 6.5
- Published
- 2026-10-09
- OWASP
- A04 Insecure Design
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Resource Management
- Subcategory
- Resource Exhaustion
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Denial of Service (DoS)
- Affected component
- pyLoad
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade pyLoad to version 0.5.0b3.dev101.
Vulnerable code sample
from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
api = Blueprint('api', __name__)
@api.route('/rpc', methods=['POST'])
def rpc():
# VULNERABLE: reads entire uploaded file into memory
uploaded = request.files.get('file')
if not uploaded:
return jsonify({'error': 'no file'}), 400
data = uploaded.read() # whole file loaded
# Pass data to downstream processing (placeholder)
result = process_payload(data)
return jsonify({'status': 'ok', 'result': result})
def process_payload(blob):
# placeholder for actual RPC handling
return len(blob)Patched code sample
from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
from werkzeug.utils import secure_filename
import os
api = Blueprint('api', __name__)
MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # 10 MB
@api.route('/rpc', methods=['POST'])
def rpc():
# FIX: stream file and enforce size limit
uploaded = request.files.get('file')
if not uploaded:
return jsonify({'error': 'no file'}), 400
filename = secure_filename(uploaded.filename)
temp_path = os.path.join('/tmp', filename)
total = 0
with open(temp_path, 'wb') as f:
while True:
chunk = uploaded.stream.read(8192)
if not chunk:
break
total += len(chunk)
if total > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE:
f.close()
os.remove(temp_path)
return jsonify({'error': 'file too large'}), 413
f.write(chunk)
with open(temp_path, 'rb') as f:
data = f.read()
os.remove(temp_path)
result = process_payload(data)
return jsonify({'status': 'ok', 'result': result})
def process_payload(blob):
# placeholder for actual RPC handling
return len(blob)Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- fix GHSA-vq8p-m3wm-gv5f security advisory (pyload/pyload)
src/pyload/webui/app/config.py
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202648484,
title = {{Unbounded memory consumption via multipart upload leading to DoS.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-48484},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-48484/}}
}
Introducing the "VAITP dataset": a specialized repository of Python vulnerabilities and patches, meticulously compiled for the use of the security research community. As Python's prominence grows, understanding and addressing potential security vulnerabilities become crucial. Crafted by and for the cybersecurity community, this dataset offers a valuable resource for researchers, analysts, and developers to analyze and mitigate the security risks associated with Python. Through the comprehensive exploration of vulnerabilities and corresponding patches, the VAITP dataset fosters a safer and more resilient Python ecosystem, encouraging collaborative advancements in programming security.
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