CVE-2026-54293
Path traversal in NLTK's data.load() using URL-encoded characters.
- CVSS 7.5
- CWE-22
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit) is a suite of open source Python modules, data sets, and tutorials supporting research and development in Natural Language Processing. Prior to 3.10.0-rc1, nltk.data.load() in NLTK is vulnerable to path traversal via URL-encoded path separators and traversal segments when using the nltk: URL scheme. The unsafe-path regex check is performed before url2pathname() decodes the %xx sequences (a classic decode-after-check / TOCTOU-style flaw), allowing an attacker to bypass the protection documented in NLTK's SECURITY.md and read arbitrary files from the filesystem. While literal traversal strings such as ../../../etc/passwd are correctly blocked, encoded variants such as %2fetc%2fpasswd, %2e%2e%2f…, and ..%2f..%2f slip past the regex and are subsequently decoded into a real filesystem path. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.10.0-rc1.
- CWE
- CWE-22
- CVSS base score
- 7.5
- Published
- 2026-06-22
- OWASP
- A01 Broken Access Control
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Incorrect Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Path Traversal
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Information Disclosure
- Affected component
- NLTK
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade NLTK to version 3.10.0-rc1 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import re
import os
from urllib.request import url2pathname
_UNSAFE_PATH_REGEX = re.compile(r"""
(^(/|\\)) | # starts with a path separator
(\.\.) | # contains '..'
(?!nltk:) # does not start with 'nltk:'
""", re.VERBOSE)
def find(resource_name, paths=None):
# This is a simplified stand-in for NLTK's actual find mechanism.
# It demonstrates the path joining part of the vulnerability.
if paths is None:
# A default search path for the example
paths = ["/tmp/nltk_data"]
for path in paths:
# The decoded, and now unsafe, path is joined here.
full_path = os.path.join(path, resource_name)
if os.path.exists(full_path):
return full_path
raise LookupError(f"Resource {resource_name} not found.")
def load(resource_url, format='auto', cache=True, verbose=False):
# The vulnerability is in how the resource_url is handled.
# 1. The check is performed on the raw, URL-encoded string.
# A path like 'corpora/../../../../../etc/passwd' would be blocked.
if _UNSAFE_PATH_REGEX.search(resource_url):
raise ValueError(f"Malicious path component detected in '{resource_url}'")
# 2. The URL is then decoded *after* the check.
# An encoded path like 'corpora/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd'
# passes the regex check above, but url2pathname decodes it
# into a malicious path. This is the core of the vulnerability.
resource_path = url2pathname(resource_url.split(':', 1)[1])
# 3. The decoded, potentially malicious path is used to find and open a file.
filepath = find(resource_path)
with open(filepath, 'rb') as f:
return f.read()Patched code sample
import re
from urllib.parse import unquote
import os
# This regex is a simplified representation of a check for unsafe path components.
# It looks for directory traversal attempts or absolute paths.
UNSAFE_PATH_REGEX = re.compile(r"\.\.[/\\]|[/\\]\.\.|^[/\\]|^[a-zA-Z]:[/\\]")
def fixed_nltk_data_load(resource_url: str):
"""
A conceptual fix demonstrating how to prevent path traversal by
decoding the URL path before validation, as described in CVE-2026-54293.
"""
if not resource_url.startswith("nltk:"):
raise ValueError(f"Unsupported resource URL: {resource_url}")
path_component = resource_url[len("nltk:"):]
# THE FIX:
# 1. First, decode any URL-encoded characters (e.g., %2e, %2f).
# This ensures that the security check sees the actual path components
# an attacker is trying to use, preventing a "decode-after-check" flaw.
decoded_path = unquote(path_component)
# 2. Second, perform the security check on the now-decoded path.
# An attack like '..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd' becomes '../etc/passwd',
# which is now correctly caught by the regex.
if UNSAFE_PATH_REGEX.search(decoded_path):
raise ValueError(
f"Path traversal or absolute path detected in '{decoded_path}'"
)
# If the check passes, the path is considered safe. In a real implementation,
# it would be joined with a trusted base directory to load a file.
# For example:
#
# from nltk.downloader import Downloader
# downloader = Downloader()
# safe_full_path = downloader.find(decoded_path)
# with open(safe_full_path) as f:
# return f.read()
# Placeholder for safe file loading logic
passPayload
nltk.data.load('nltk:%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc/passwd')
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202654293,
title = {{Path traversal in NLTK's data.load() using URL-encoded characters.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-54293},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-54293/}}
}
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