CVE-2026-63378
Authenticated users can inject arbitrary Python via script_code, achieving root container compromise.
- CVSS 8.8
- CWE-94
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, any authenticated user with a valid `fctr_session` cookie can submit arbitrary Python source in the `script_code` field of `POST /api/react/execute-script`, without administrator privilege. In `src/api/routers/react_stream.py`, the source is stored with `skip_discovery=True`, bypassing AI-based content filtering, and is passed to `validate_generated_code` in `src/utils/security_config.py`. `BLOCKED_PATTERNS` recognizes direct `__import__` calls but misses the import name passed as a string, `getattr` is in `ALLOWED_BUILTINS`, and the AST checker handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` targets but fails to handle `ast.Call` targets. Dynamic `getattr` call chains through `__builtins__` therefore evade validation. The `_write_temp_script` helper writes the accepted code to disk, and `asyncio.create_subprocess_exec()` executes it as the application process user, which is root in the default container. Command output is returned as Server-Sent Events through `GET /api/react/stream-react-updates?process_id=<id>`. The resulting container compromise can disclose environment secrets including Okta API tokens and the JWT key, expose the SQLite database, and permit backend-service pivoting and persistence. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.
- CWE
- CWE-94
- CVSS base score
- 8.8
- Published
- 2026-10-30
- OWASP
- A03 Injection
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Incorrect Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Command Injection
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Arbitrary Code Execution
- Affected component
- TAKO AI Agent for Okta
Solution
Upgrade to TAKO AI Agent for Okta v3.0.1‑beta (or later).
Vulnerable code sample
import ast, asyncio, tempfile, os
BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [r'__import__']
ALLOWED_BUILTINS = {'getattr'}
def validate_generated_code(source: str) -> bool:
tree = ast.parse(source)
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if isinstance(node, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.func, ast.Name):
if node.func.id in BLOCKED_PATTERNS:
return False
return True
async def execute_script(script_code: str):
# VULNERABLE: dynamic import via getattr bypasses validation
if not validate_generated_code(script_code):
raise ValueError("Blocked script")
# write script to temp file
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile('w', delete=False, suffix='.py') as f:
f.write(script_code)
script_path = f.name
# execute as root
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
'python', script_path,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE
)
stdout, stderr = await proc.communicate()
os.unlink(script_path)
return stdout, stderrPatched code sample
import ast, asyncio, tempfile, os, importlib
BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [r'__import__']
ALLOWED_BUILTINS = {'getattr'}
def validate_generated_code(source: str) -> bool:
tree = ast.parse(source)
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
# FIX: reject dynamic import patterns in call targets
if isinstance(node.func, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.func.func, ast.Name):
if node.func.func.id == 'getattr' and any(
isinstance(arg, ast.Str) and arg.s == '__import__' for arg in node.func.args):
return False
if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name) and node.func.id in BLOCKED_PATTERNS:
return False
return True
async def execute_script(script_code: str):
if not validate_generated_code(script_code):
raise ValueError("Blocked script")
# write script to temp file
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile('w', delete=False, suffix='.py') as f:
f.write(script_code)
script_path = f.name
# execute as root
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
'python', script_path,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE
)
stdout, stderr = await proc.communicate()
os.unlink(script_path)
return stdout, stderrPublished fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- Harden initial setup and disable direct script replay (fctr-id/okta-ai-agent)
src/api/main.py · lifespan,src/api/routers/auth.py,src/api/routers/auth.py · check_setup_status,src/api/routers/auth.py · initial_setup,src/api/routers/react_stream.py · execute_script_directly
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202663378,
title = {{Authenticated users can inject arbitrary Python via script_code, achieving root container compromise.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-63378},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-63378/}}
}
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