CVE-2026-64855
SOAP library trusts embedded certs, allowing forged signatures and auth bypass.
- CVSS 8.2
- CWE-295
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Remote
soapbar is a SOAP library for Python — client, server, and WSDL handling. Prior to version 0.13.0, verify_envelope_bsp() derived its trust anchor from the message it was verifying. It read the X.509 certificate out of the caller-untrusted wsse:BinarySecurityToken, validated only that certificate's not-before / not-after dates, and then verified the signature against that same certificate. There was no CA-chain validation, no issuer/subject allowlist, and no pinning. A successful verify_envelope_bsp() therefore proved only that the envelope was signed by whoever supplied the embedded certificate — never that it was signed by a trusted party. An attacker who mints their own certificate, signs a forged envelope, and embeds that certificate in the token passes verification. Any consumer that treats a successful BSP verification as authentication can be impersonated (signature forgery / authentication bypass). verify_envelope() (which pins a caller-supplied x509_cert) was not affected — the flaw was specific to the BSP variant whose trust anchor came from the message. This issue has been patched in version 0.13.0.
- CWE
- CWE-295
- CVSS base score
- 8.2
- Published
- 2026-11-11
- OWASP
- A07 Identification and Authentication Failures
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Subcategory
- Insecure Authentication Mechanisms
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Unauthorized Access
- Affected component
- soapbar 0.13.0
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade soapbar to version 0.13.0 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import soapbar
from soapbar.wsse import BinarySecurityToken
def process_request(envelope_xml: str) -> bool:
"""
Verify the SOAP envelope using BSP rules.
Returns True if verification succeeds.
"""
# VULNERABLE: trust anchor taken from untrusted BinarySecurityToken
envelope = soapbar.parse(envelope_xml)
token = envelope.header.find(BinarySecurityToken)
# The library internally extracts the X.509 cert from token and uses it as trust anchor
return envelope.verify_envelope_bsp()Patched code sample
import soapbar
from soapbar.wsse import BinarySecurityToken
from cryptography.x509 import Certificate
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
def load_trusted_ca() -> Certificate:
# Load a trusted CA certificate from a secure location
with open("/etc/ssl/certs/trusted_ca.pem", "rb") as f:
return Certificate.load_pem(f.read())
def process_request(envelope_xml: str) -> bool:
"""
Verify the SOAP envelope using BSP rules with explicit trusted CA.
Returns True if verification succeeds.
"""
# FIX: supply a known trusted CA instead of deriving trust from the message
trusted_ca = load_trusted_ca()
envelope = soapbar.parse(envelope_xml)
token = envelope.header.find(BinarySecurityToken)
return envelope.verify_envelope_bsp(trust_anchor=trusted_ca)Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- fix(security): require a trust anchor in verify_envelope_bsp (GHSA-859w-52fx-hcm6) (hitoshyamamoto/soapbar)
examples/04_ws_security_signing/sign_and_verify.py · main,src/soapbar/core/wssecurity.py,src/soapbar/core/wssecurity.py · verify_envelope_bsp
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202664855,
title = {{SOAP library trusts embedded certs, allowing forged signatures and auth bypass.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-64855},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-64855/}}
}
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