CVE-2026-67543
Untrusted skill code runs without Docker sandbox, gaining host‑root access.
- CVSS 8.8
- CWE-94
- Design Defects
- Remote
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.
- CWE
- CWE-94
- CVSS base score
- 8.8
- Published
- 2026-11-11
- OWASP
- A05 Security Misconfiguration
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Design Defects
- Subcategory
- Poorly Designed Access Controls
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Privilege Escalation
- Affected component
- Heym
Solution
Upgrade Heym to version 0.0.70 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
import subprocess
def execute_skill(skill_script: str, args: list):
"""
Run a user-provided Python skill script.
"""
# VULNERABLE: runs untrusted code with full environment and without isolation
subprocess.run(
["python3", skill_script] + args,
env=os.environ, # passes all host env vars
cwd="/tmp", # writable directory
check=True
)Patched code sample
import os
import subprocess
def execute_skill(skill_script: str, args: list):
"""
Run a user-provided Python skill script.
"""
# FIX: restrict environment and drop privileges
safe_env = {
"PATH": os.getenv("PATH", ""),
"PYTHONIOENCODING": "utf-8"
}
subprocess.run(
["python3", skill_script] + args,
env=safe_env, # limited env vars
cwd="/tmp",
preexec_fn=lambda: os.setuid(65534), # run as nobody
check=True
)Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- Sandbox untrusted skill Python execution (GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73) (heymrun/heym)
backend/app/services/skill_python_executor.py,backend/app/services/skill_python_executor.py · execute_skill_python,backend/app/services/skill_python_executor.py · _collect_output_files,backend/app/services/skill_python_executor.py · _safe_env,backend/app/services/skill_python_executor.py · _write_skill_file
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202667543,
title = {{Untrusted skill code runs without Docker sandbox, gaining host‑root access.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-67543},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-67543/}}
}
Introducing the "VAITP dataset": a specialized repository of Python vulnerabilities and patches, meticulously compiled for the use of the security research community. As Python's prominence grows, understanding and addressing potential security vulnerabilities become crucial. Crafted by and for the cybersecurity community, this dataset offers a valuable resource for researchers, analysts, and developers to analyze and mitigate the security risks associated with Python. Through the comprehensive exploration of vulnerabilities and corresponding patches, the VAITP dataset fosters a safer and more resilient Python ecosystem, encouraging collaborative advancements in programming security.
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