CVE-2026-71283
Path traversal via unsafe tar extraction in admin backup‑restore upload handler.
- CVSS 4.9
- CWE-22
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
Fledge's backup-restore upload handler, upload_backup (python/fledge/services/core/api/backup_restore.py), calls tarfile.extractall(temp_path) on an admin-uploaded tar archive with no filter argument and no per-member path validation. Requires the admin role (@has_permission("admin")).
- CWE
- CWE-22
- CVSS base score
- 4.9
- Published
- 2026-08-05
- OWASP
- A04 Insecure Design
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Path Traversal
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Arbitrary Code Execution
- Affected component
- Python
- Fixed by upgrading
- Yes
Solution
Upgrade Fledge to version 1.11.2 (or later), which adds safe‑extraction checks to the upload_backup handler to prevent path traversal. If you cannot upgrade, replace tarfile.extractall(temp_path) with a safe‑extract routine that validates each member’s path before extraction.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
import tarfile
from flask import request
from fledge.services.core.api import has_permission
@has_permission("admin")
def upload_backup():
"""
Handle admin-uploaded backup tar archive.
"""
uploaded_file = request.files['backup']
temp_path = "/tmp/backup_extract"
os.makedirs(temp_path, exist_ok=True)
# VULNERABLE: extracts without path validation, enabling path traversal
with tarfile.open(fileobj=uploaded_file, mode="r:gz") as tar:
tar.extractall(temp_path)
# Continue processing...
process_extracted_backup(temp_path)Patched code sample
import os
import tarfile
from flask import request
from fledge.services.core.api import has_permission
@has_permission("admin")
def upload_backup():
"""
Handle admin-uploaded backup tar archive.
"""
uploaded_file = request.files['backup']
temp_path = "/tmp/backup_extract"
os.makedirs(temp_path, exist_ok=True)
# FIX: validates each member to prevent path traversal
def is_safe(member):
member_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(temp_path, member.name))
return member_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(temp_path))
with tarfile.open(fileobj=uploaded_file, mode="r:gz") as tar:
safe_members = [m for m in tar.getmembers() if is_safe(m)]
tar.extractall(temp_path, members=safe_members)
# Continue processing...
process_extracted_backup(temp_path)Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202671283,
title = {{Path traversal via unsafe tar extraction in admin backup‑restore upload handler.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-71283},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-71283/}}
}
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