CVE-2026-84706
Credential type injector bypass allows arbitrary code exec via BASH_ENV.
- CVSS 7.6
- CWE-184
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Remote
A flaw was found in Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The custom Credential Type environment-variable injector validates variable names against a deny-list (an ANSIBLE_* prefix check plus a fixed ENV_BLOCKLIST) that omits process-hijacking loader variables such as BASH_ENV, ENV, LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, PYTHONSTARTUP and GIT_SSH_COMMAND. Combined with the credential file injector, a privileged user can write an attacker-controlled script into the execution environment and point BASH_ENV at it, obtaining arbitrary code execution inside the execution-environment container for any job that attaches a credential of that type.
- CWE
- CWE-184
- CVSS base score
- 7.6
- Published
- 2026-09-23
- OWASP
- A05 Security Misconfiguration
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Checking
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Input Validation and Sanitization
- Subcategory
- Command Injection
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Arbitrary Code Execution
- Affected component
- Ansible
Solution
Upgrade Ansible Automation Platform to version 2.3.2 (or later), which includes the fix that adds proper allow‑list validation for environment variables in custom Credential Types.
Vulnerable code sample
import os
ENV_BLOCKLIST = {"PATH", "HOME", "SHELL"}
def inject_credential_env(creds: dict, target_env: dict) -> dict:
"""
Merge credential-provided environment variables into the target environment.
The function is supposed to block dangerous loader variables.
"""
for key, value in creds.items():
# VULNERABLE: insufficient deny‑list, allows loader vars like BASH_ENV
if key.startswith("ANSIBLE_") or key in ENV_BLOCKLIST:
continue
target_env[key] = value
return target_envPatched code sample
import os
ENV_BLOCKLIST = {"PATH", "HOME", "SHELL", "BASH_ENV", "ENV", "LD_PRELOAD",
"LD_LIBRARY_PATH", "PYTHONSTARTUP", "GIT_SSH_COMMAND"}
def inject_credential_env(creds: dict, target_env: dict) -> dict:
"""
Merge credential-provided environment variables into the target environment.
The function now blocks all known loader variables.
"""
for key, value in creds.items():
# FIX: expanded deny‑list includes loader variables
if key.startswith("ANSIBLE_") or key in ENV_BLOCKLIST:
continue
target_env[key] = value
return target_envCite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202684706,
title = {{Credential type injector bypass allows arbitrary code exec via BASH_ENV.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-84706},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-84706/}}
}
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