CVE-2026-96455
Unauthenticated app install API lets any LAN user run arbitrary code on robot.
- CVSS 8.8
- CWE-306
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Remote
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.
- CWE
- CWE-306
- CVSS base score
- 8.8
- Published
- 2026-09-23
- OWASP
- A07 Identification and Authentication Failures
- Orthogonal defect classification
- Interface
- Code defect classification
- Missing Check
- Category
- Authentication, Authorization, and Session Management
- Subcategory
- Insecure Authentication Mechanisms
- Accessibility scope
- Remote
- Impact
- Arbitrary Code Execution
- Affected component
- Starlette
Solution
Update Reachy Mini to v1 .9 .0 (or later), which adds authentication and restricts the /apps/install endpoint to authorized users only.
Vulnerable code sample
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status
from pydantic import BaseModel
router = APIRouter()
class AppInfo(BaseModel):
name: str
hf_space_url: str
def get_app_manager():
# In actual code this returns a manager stored in app.state
return {"install_package": lambda url: None}
@router.post("/apps/install")
async def install_app(
app_info: AppInfo,
manager=Depends(get_app_manager), # VULNERABLE: no authentication
):
# No credential check – any client can trigger installation
try:
manager["install_package"](app_info.hf_space_url)
return {"detail": "Installation started"}
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, detail=str(e))Patched code sample
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Security, status
from fastapi.security import HTTPBasic, HTTPBasicCredentials
from pydantic import BaseModel
router = APIRouter()
class AppInfo(BaseModel):
name: str
hf_space_url: str
def get_app_manager():
return {"install_package": lambda url: None}
security = HTTPBasic()
def authenticate(credentials: HTTPBasicCredentials = Security(security)):
# Simple username/password check; replace with real auth mechanism
if credentials.username != "admin" or credentials.password != "s3cr3t":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Invalid credentials",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Basic"},
)
return credentials.username
@router.post("/apps/install")
async def install_app(
app_info: AppInfo,
manager=Depends(get_app_manager),
_: str = Depends(authenticate), # FIX: enforce authentication
):
try:
manager["install_package"](app_info.hf_space_url)
return {"detail": "Installation started"}
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, detail=str(e))Published fix
Public sources link this CVE to the changes below. The code samples above were generated to illustrate the defect; these links lead to the code the project actually changed.
- daemon: restrict CORS to localhost instead of wildcard (pollen-robotics/reachy_mini)
src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py · create_app
Cite this entry
@misc{vaitp:cve202696455,
title = {{Unauthenticated app install API lets any LAN user run arbitrary code on robot.}},
author = {Bogaerts, Fr\'ed\'eric and Ivaki, Naghmeh and Fonseca, Jos\'e},
year = {2026},
note = {VAITP Python Vulnerability Dataset, entry CVE-2026-96455},
howpublished = {\url{https://netpack.pt/vaitp/vulnerability/CVE-2026-96455/}}
}
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