VAITP

Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host and Application include Windows client components (PrinterInstallerClientInterface.exe, PrinterInstallerClient.exe, PrinterInstallerClientLauncher.exe) that lack modern compile-time and runtime exploit mitigations and rely on outdated runtimes. These binaries are built as 32-bit, without Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Control Flow Guard (CFG), or stack-protection, and they incorporate legacy technologies (Pascal/Delphi and Python 2) which are no longer commonly maintained. Several of these processes run with elevated privileges (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM for PrinterInstallerClient.exe and PrinterInstallerClientLauncher.exe), and the client automatically downloads and installs printer drivers. The absence of modern memory safety mitigations and the use of unmaintained runtimes substantially increase the risk that memory-corruption or other exploit primitives — for example from crafted driver content or maliciously crafted inputs — can be turned into remote or local code execution and privilege escalation to SYSTEM.

The Keras Model.load_model method can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution, even with safe_mode=True. One can create a specially crafted .keras model archive that, when loaded via Model.load_model, will trigger arbitrary code to be executed. This is achieved by crafting a special config.json (a file within the .keras archive) that will invoke keras.config.enable_unsafe_deserialization() to disable safe mode. Once safe mode is disable, one can use the Lambda layer feature of keras, which allows arbitrary Python code in the form of pickled code. Both can appear in the same archive. Simply the keras.config.enable_unsafe_deserialization() needs to appear first in the archive and the Lambda with arbitrary code needs to be second.

The Keras Model.load_model method can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution, even with safe_mode=True. One can create a specially crafted .h5/.hdf5 model archive that, when loaded via Model.load_model, will trigger arbitrary code to be executed. This is achieved by crafting a special .h5 archive file that uses the Lambda layer feature of keras which allows arbitrary Python code in the form of pickled code. The vulnerability comes from the fact that the safe_mode=True option is not honored when reading .h5 archives. Note that the .h5/.hdf5 format is a legacy format supported by Keras 3 for backwards compatibility.

The cbis_manager Podman container is vulnerable to remote command execution via the /api/plugins endpoint. Improper sanitization of the HTTP Headers X-FILENAME, X-PAGE, and X-FIELD allows for command injection. These headers are directly utilized within the subprocess.Popen Python function without adequate validation, enabling a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying system by crafting malicious header values within an HTTP request to the affected endpoint. The web service executes with root privileges within the container environment, the demonstrated remote code execution permits an attacker to acquire elevated privileges for the command execution. Restricting access to the management network with an external firewall can partially mitigate this risk.

NVIDIA Triton Inference Server for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the Python backend, where an attacker could cause a remote code execution by manipulating the model name parameter in the model control APIs. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to remote code execution, denial of service, information disclosure, and data tampering.

A command injection vulnerability in FTP-Flask-python through 5173b68 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands. The /ftp.html endpoint's "Upload File" action constructs a shell command from the ftp_file parameter and executes it using os.system() without sanitization or escaping.

PyInstaller bundles a Python application and all its dependencies into a single package. Due to a special entry being appended to `sys.path` during the bootstrap process of a PyInstaller-frozen application, and due to the bootstrap script attempting to load an optional module for bytecode decryption while this entry is still present in `sys.path`, an application built with PyInstaller < 6.0.0 may be tricked by an unprivileged attacker into executing arbitrary python code when **all** of the following conditions are met. First, the application is built with PyInstaller < 6.0.0; both onedir and onefile mode are affected. Second, the optional bytecode encryption code feature was not enabled during the application build. Third, the attacker can create files/directories in the same directory where the executable is located. Fourth, the filesystem supports creation of files/directories that contain `?` in their name (i.e., non-Windows systems). Fifth, the attacker is able to determine the offset at which the PYZ archive is embedded in the executable. The attacker can create a directory (or a zip archive) next to the executable, with the name that matches the format used by PyInstaller's bootloader to transmit information about the location of PYZ archive to the bootstrap script. If this directory (or zip archive) contains a python module whose name matches the name used by the optional bytecode encryption feature, this module will be loaded and executed by the bootstrap script (in the absence of the real, built-in module that is available when the bytecode-encryption feature is enabled). This results in arbitrary code execution that requires no modification of the executable itself. If the executable is running with elevated privileges (for example, due to having the `setuid` bit set), the code in the injected module is also executed with the said elevated privileges, resulting in a local privilege escalation. PyInstaller 6.0.0 (f5adf291c8b832d5aff7632844f7e3ddf7ad4923) removed support for bytecode encryption; this effectively removes the described attack vector, due to the bootstrap script not attempting to load the optional module for bytecode-decryption anymore. PyInstaller 6.10.0 (cfd60b510f95f92cb81fc42735c399bb781a4739) reworked the bootstrap process to avoid (ab)using `sys.path` for transmitting location of the PYZ archive, which further eliminates the possibility of described injection procedure. If upgrading PyInstaller is not feasible, this issue can be worked around by ensuring proper permissions on directories containing security-sensitive executables (i.e., executables with `setuid` bit set) should mitigate the issue.

Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. A command injection vulnerability in Tautulli v2.15.3 and prior allows attackers with administrative privileges to obtain remote code execution on the application server. This vulnerability requires the application to have been cloned from GitHub and installed manually. When Tautulli is cloned directly from GitHub and installed manually, the application manages updates and versioning through calls to the `git` command. In the code, this is performed through the `runGit` function in `versioncheck.py`. Since `shell=True` is passed to `subproces.Popen`, this call is vulnerable to subject to command injection, as shell characters within arguments will be passed to the underlying shell. A concrete location where this can be triggered is in the `checkout_git_branch` endpoint. This endpoint stores a user-supplied remote and branch name into the `GIT_REMOTE` and `GIT_BRANCH` configuration keys without sanitization. Downstream, these keys are then fetched and passed directly into `runGit` using a format string. Hence, code execution can be obtained by using `$()` interpolation in a command. Version 2.16.0 contains a fix for the issue.

Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. In Tautulli v2.15.3 and earlier, an attacker with administrative access can use the `pms_image_proxy` endpoint to write arbitrary python scripts into the application filesystem. This leads to remote code execution when combined with the `Script` notification agent. If an attacker with administrative access changes the URL of the PMS to a server they control, they can then abuse the `pms_image_proxy` to obtain a file write into the application filesystem. This can be done by making a `pms_image_proxy` request with a URL in the `img` parameter and the desired file name in the `img_format` parameter. Tautulli then uses a hash of the desired metadata together with the `img_format` in order to construct a file path. Since the attacker controls `img_format` which occupies the end of the file path, and `img_format` is not sanitised, the attacker can then use path traversal characters to specify filename of their choosing. If the specified file does not exist, Tautaulli will then attempt to fetch the image from the configured PMS. Since the attacker controls the PMS, they can return arbitrary content in response to this request, which will then be written into the specified file. An attacker can write an arbitrary python script into a location on the application file system. The attacker can then make use of the built-in `Script` notification agent to run the local script, obtaining remote code execution on the application server. Users should upgrade to version 2.16.0 to receive a patch.

Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. The `real_pms_image_proxy` endpoint in Tautulli v2.15.3 and prior is vulnerable to path traversal, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the application server's filesystem. The `real_pms_image_proxy` is used to fetch an image directly from the backing Plex Media Server. The image to be fetched is specified through an `img` URL parameter, which can either be a URL or a file path. There is some validation ensuring that `img` begins with the prefix `interfaces/default/images` in order to be served from the local filesystem. However this can be bypassed by passing an `img` parameter which begins with a valid prefix, and then adjoining path traversal characters in order to reach files outside of intended directories. An attacker can exfiltrate files on the application file system, including the `tautulli.db` SQLite database containing active JWT tokens, as well as the `config.ini` file which contains the hashed admin password, the JWT token secret, and the Plex Media Server token and connection details. If the password is cracked, or if a valid JWT token is present in the database, an unauthenticated attacker can escalate their privileges to obtain administrative control over the application. Version 2.16.0 contains a fix for the issue.